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Abstract 
Recently developed counterfactual techniques that combine quantile regression with 
a  bootstrap  approach  allow  for  the  interpretation  of  lower  quantiles  of  the  ‘simulated 
unconditional wage distribution’ as if they related to poor people. We use this approach to 
analyse gender wage gaps across the wage distribution in Sri Lanka using quarterly labour 
force data from 1996 to 2004. Male and female wages are equal at the overall mean, but 
differ greatly between public and private sectors and across the wage distribution. We find 
that differences in the way identical men and women are rewarded in the labour market more 
than account for the difference in wages throughout the distribution. We find evidence of 
wider wage gaps at the bottom of the distribution in both sectors (indicative of “sticky floors”), 
but little evidence of larger gaps at the top of the distribution (“glass ceilings”). Conditional 
wage gaps increase when controls for occupation, industry and part-time employment status 
are  included,  consistent  with  females  selecting  into  occupations  that  better  reward  their 
characteristics. Policies that address gender bias in wage setting - especially in the low and 
unskilled occupations - are indicated, while policies that address gender bias in hiring and in 
workplace  practices  are  likely  to  be  more  appropriate  than  policies  that  seek  to  improve 
womens’ productivity-enhancing characteristics in reducing the gender wage gap. 
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1.  Introduction 
Sri Lanka is foremost among countries that have made considerable advances in 
gender  equity,  especially  in  relation  to  education  access  and  health  outcomes.
1  Gender 
equality is enshrined in the 1978 constitution as a fundamental right, and Sri Lanka has 
ratified all four key conventions that promote gender equality at work.
2 Yet, despite rising 
female labour force participation since the 1990s, it is reported that Sri Lankan women face 
“glass ceilings” and “brick walls” in the labour market (Wickramasinghe and Jayatilaka, 2005, 
2006).
3 
Standard analyses of the mean gender wage gap in Sri Lanka indicate that the gap is 
quite small, but little or none of it is due to differences in productive characteristics between 
men  and  women.  Rather,  the  entire  gap  is  attributed  to  differences  in  returns  to 
characteristics  (Aturupane  1996,  Gunewardena  2002,  Ajwad  and  Kurukulasuriya  2002).
4 
This is not surprising, given the relatively high human capital endowments of Sri Lankan 
women. However, little is known about the degree to which the gender wage gap varies 
across the distribution and the reasons for such.  
The  application  of  quantile  regression  techniques  (Koenker  and  Basset  1978)  to 
many  areas  in  economics,  including  labour,  public,  and  development  economics 
(Fitzenberger, Koenker and Machado 2001, Koenker and Hallock 2001) has led to a new 
approach to the examination of ‘glass ceilings.’ Glass ceilings are generally understood to 
mean that “women do quite well in the labour market up to a point, after which there is an 
effective limit on their prospects” (Albrecht et al. 2003). Thus, larger wage gaps, conditional 
on covariates at the top of the wage distribution are said to be consistent with the existence 
of ‘glass ceilings’, while pay gaps that widen at the bottom of the conditional distribution, are 
termed  ‘sticky  floors,’  or  “glass  ceilings  at  the  ground  floor”  (Arulampalam  et  al.  2005, 
Albrecht et al. 2003, de la Rica et al. 2005).  
The  glass  ceiling  phenomenon  can  be  manifested  as  the  inequitable  rationing  of 
’good‘  jobs,  which  are  in  short  supply  (Pendakur  and  Pendakur  2007).  Typically,  this  is 
understood to mean that when there are two or more groups of unequal status in the labour 
market,  the  subordinate  group  will  have  earnings  distributions  which  look  similar  to  the 
                                                 
1 Higher life expectancy for women (than men) was achieved in the late 1960s, maternal mortality is 
low, parity in primary school enrolments and higher female secondary school enrolment was evident 
by the 1990s. Female enrollment in tertiary education however, is only 69 percent of male enrollment 
which is lower than in many medium human development index countries (UNDP 2000). 
2 Equal Remuneration Convention, Convention on Discrimination, Convention on Workers with Family 
Responsibilities, and Convention on Maternity Protection. 
3 Wickremasinghe and Jayatilaka use these terms to refer to the observation that men and women 
tend to be employed in different occupations and women tend to occupy the lower rungs. 
4 See Table 1 for a summary of the results of these studies.  
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dominant group over ordinary jobs, but are comparatively thin over high-paying jobs. In their 
study of glass ceilings for ethnic minorities in Canada, Pendakur and Pendakur (2007) argue 
that,  given  that  one  can  rarely  control  for  all  characteristics  relevant  to  the  potential 
productivity  of  workers  such  as  raw  ability  or  intelligence,  glass  ceilings  may  manifest 
themselves in any part of the distribution. The main thrust of their argument is that “good 
jobs” will exist for all types of workers, including those with high ability, and those with low 
ability. In Sri Lanka for example, being a doctor, lawyer, engineer or accountant would be a 
good job for workers with high raw ability, while being a clerk or peon in a government office 
would  be  a  good  job  for  workers  with  median  raw  ability,  because  these  jobs  pay  well, 
conditional on productivity-related covariates. Many women may not have access to these 
jobs, because they are rationed.  
The  phenomenon  of  ‘sticky  floors’  may  also  occur  because  the  wage  distribution 
reflects  labour  market  segmentation,  with  informal  jobs  occupying  the  lower  end  of  the 
distribution (Pianto, Pianto and Arias 2004). In this scenario, sticky floors are really ‘sticky 
doors’ in the sense that they reflect the presence of barriers against access to ‘good jobs’ for 
disadvantaged groups.
5 We do not test if sticky floors are sticky doors in this paper, but we 
do examine if (1) the sticky floor phenomenon is purely a composition effect of relatively low 
paying jobs for women in the private sector with relatively higher paying jobs in the public 
sector, and (2) if sticky floors are related to occupational categories. 
The  ‘sticky  floors’  phenomenon  may  occur  for  other  reasons.  Even  in  regulated 
labour markets with anti-discrimination legislation, sticky floors may occur because “only the 
more articulate and better educated are willing to take legal action against breaches of the 
law”, because men are initially appointed at a higher starting salary (rung) within a particular 
scale, or because women at the bottom have less bargaining power compared to men due to 
family commitments or social custom (Arulampalam et al. 2006). 
The approach used in these studies is descriptive, and does not provide tests for 
whether  a  glass  ceiling  -  or  sticky  floor  -  exists.  However,  knowing  where  in  the  wage 
distribution unexplained gender wage gaps lie, and how their magnitude varies throughout 
the distribution, can help to better understand gender discrimination in the labour market and 
to  design  more  effective  policies  to  reduce  or  eliminate  it.  Policies  designed  to  address 
discrimination have both equity and efficiency gains. The equity gains will be even higher if 
analysis reveals gender disparities to be larger at the bottom of the distribution. Empirical 
analysis of the gender-poverty nexus suffers from the fact that much of the data used to 
analyse poverty is aggregated at the level of the household, subsuming any intra-household 
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Robin Naylor for suggesting this line of investigation, and the term ‘sticky doors’. 
Wickremasinghe and Jayatilaka (2005) use the term ‘brick walls’ to describe a similar concept.  
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gender inequality. Where data is available, e.g. relating to health and education outcomes, 
analyses  of  gender  inequalities  find  that  they  are  greater  among  the  poor  (World  Bank 
2001). Similar analyses of wage inequalities among the poor in developing countries have 
yet to be conducted although wage data, which are collected at the level of the individual, 
allow  for  gender  specific  analysis.  Counterfactual  analysis  based  on  quantile  regression 
makes such an analysis possible. As Sakellariou (2004) points out, the generation of more 
country studies using this approach ‘will allow the emergence of stylized facts of gender 
discrimination  in  labour  markets’.  This  paper  makes  one  of  the  first  contributions  to  this 
literature from a developing country’s perspective.
6, 7 
Several  approaches  to  examining  wage  distributions  can  be  seen  within  the  new 
“glass ceiling” literature. Some, like Pendakur and Pendakur (2007), examine conditional 
quantiles, but constrain returns to productive characteristics to be the same for all groups. 
Others have extended the use of quantile regressions to counterfactual analysis along the 
lines of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Mueller 1998, Garcia et al. 2001, Fortin 
and Lemieux 2000, Gosling et al. 2000, Machado and Mata 2005). Studies like Albrecht et 
al. (2003) combine both approaches. 
The extension of quantile regression to Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition analysis 
employs  various  methods  for  evaluating  earnings  gaps.  Early  studies  typically  used  the 
mean  of  the  covariates  distribution  (Mueller  1998,  Garcia  et  al.  2001),  the  average 
characteristics around a symmetric neighbourhood of every quantile (Bishop, Luo and Wang 
2005) or an auxiliary regression-based framework (Gardeazabal and Ugidos 2005, Hyder 
and Reilly 2006). More recently, Machado and Mata (2005) developed a method whereby 
the entire conditional distribution of covariates is derived. This method has since been used 
to  explore  the  existence  of  glass  ceilings  and  floors  in  relation  to  gender-wage  gaps  in 
Europe (Arulampalam et al. 2006) and in transition economies (Ganguli and Terell 2005, 
Pham and Reilly 2006). 
This  paper  examines  whether  the  Sri  Lankan  labour  market  is  characterized  by 
‘sticky  floors’  and/or  ‘glass  ceilings’,  using    quantile  regression  analysis  and  applies  the 
                                                 
6  The  only  other  study  of  gender  earnings  gaps  in  a  developing  country  that  uses  the  particular 
approach (Machado-Mata decomposition) we follow in this paper that we are aware of is by Pham and 
Reilly  (2006)  for  Vietnam.  Their  study  does  not  conduct  a  disaggregated  analysis  for  public  and 
private sectors, as ours does. It also suffers from the lack of data on actual experience, relying instead 
on a measure of potential experience, which can lead to misleading results, especially in the case of 
females who may have intermittent labour force participation. 
7 It is important to note that differences in returns to a given characteristic in the upper vs. lower 
quantiles of a distribution should not be interpreted as if they were capturing differences between rich 
and poor people (Deaton 1997:82-83). However, the counterfactual approach employed here uses 
simulations to derive the unconditional wage distribution that is consistent with the conditional wage 
distribution  and  distribution  of  the  characteristics,  thereby  making  it  possible  to  interpret  lower 
quantiles of the ‘simulated unconditional wage distribution’ as if they related to poor people.  
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Machado-Mata (2005) extension of the conventional Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition 
of the gender-wage gap to Sri Lankan quarterly labour force data for the 1996-2004 period. 
The Sri Lankan case is instructive as an example of a developing country labour market 
where women have high productive characteristics, relative to males. The aim of the paper is 
to  determine  whether  wage gaps,  conditional  on  covariates,  vary  across  the  distribution. 
Quantile  regression  techniques  are  used  to  control  for  individual  characteristics,  and 
counterfactual decomposition methods are used to analyse the size and components of the 
gaps over the entire wage distribution. The analysis is conducted separately for the public 
and private sectors. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  background  on  female 
labour  market  characteristics  in  Sri  Lanka.  Section  3  describes  standard  methods  of 
decomposing  earnings  differentials  and  the  use  of  counterfactual  distributions  within  the 
quantile  regression  approach.  Section  4  describes  the  data  and  discusses  raw  wage 
distributions,  while  section  5  presents  and  discusses  decomposition  results.  Section  6 
concludes with policy implications and suggestions for future research.  
2.  Background on Sri-Lanka 
Females  in  Sri  Lanka  enjoy  higher  life  expectancy  than  males,  high  literacy  in 
comparison with similar countries, parity in primary school enrolments, and higher secondary 
school enrolments than males. Some of these favourable indicators were achieved almost 
four  decades  ago.
8  However,  it  is  only  in  the  last  two  decades  that female  labour force 
participation  and  female  employment  have  risen  to  levels  even  moderately  approaching 
those of men. A shift from a late broad-peak pattern (peaking at age 45-59 in the 1940s and 
1950s) to an early peak pattern (ages 20-29), is evident since 1971 (Kiribanda 1997) and the 
female share in the labour force increased from 22 percent in 1946 to 25 percent in 1970 
and  1980,  to  35  percent  in  1995,  after  which  it  has  remained  stable.  These  rates  are 
considerably higher than in other South Asian economies, but lower than in most East Asian 
and Transition economies (World Bank 2001).  
Much of the early expansion (until the late 1970s) in female labour force participation 
is  attributed to female  labour  supply  factors  of  rising  literacy  and  educational  attainment 
(Kiribanda 1981) as well as to the expansion of the services sector “dominated by teaching, 
health care, clerical and finance related occupations [which] provided more and new types of 
employment considered acceptable to women” (Kiribanda 1997). It should be noted that the 
state sector dominated all of these areas, and thus, much of this early impetus to female 
                                                 
8 Female life expectancy overtook male life expectancy in the late 1960s; female literacy was as high 
as 83 percent in 1981.  
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employment came from the public sector. 
However, until the mid 1980s, female labour force expansion was also accompanied 
by rising unemployment. Female unemployment rates derived from the censuses of 1971 
and 1981 were over 30 percent. With the liberalisation of the economy in 1977, GDP growth 
rates  rose  sharply  in  the  1980s,  and  labour  force  participation  rates  rose  concomitantly, 
growing at 4.1 percent in the first half of the decade and 3.3 percent in the second half of the 
decade  -  the  highest  observed  since  1946.  The  bulk  of  this  growth  came  from  the 
phenomenal increases in female labour participation - 9.8 and 6.0 percent in each half of the 
1980s, compared to male growth rates of 1.7 and 1.8 percent (Kiribanda 1997). Unlike in 
previous decades, these growth rates in labour force participation were also accompanied by 
the highest ever growth rates in female employment - 13 percent per year in the early 1980s, 
compared to an overall 5 percent per year in the same period.  
The increase in the female share in the labour force from 26 percent in 1981 to 35 
percent in 1995 was similar to trends in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia during the 1970s 
(World Bank 2001). No doubt some of the factors behind the rise in female labour force 
participation in Sri Lanka were similar to those in East Asia in the 1970s - the “surge in job 
opportunities for women, following the establishment of a large number of export-oriented 
industries in the country’s Free Trade Zones and elsewhere”, as well as the settlement of 
several thousands of families in newly opened agricultural lands following the completion of 
the Mahaweli River Diversion Scheme (Kiribanda 1997). The opening of opportunities for 
labour migration, mainly to countries in the Middle East, and the increase in home-based 
activities that has taken place in export industries in the last few years (Jayaweera et al. 
2000) were other contributing factors. 
What  is  apparent from these  patterns  of female  employment  is that “employment 
opportunities for women” in the early era were either in the public sector or the formal private 
sector, and therefore within a formal structure of wages and salaries. Disparity in wages was 
unlikely  unless  the  actual  jobs  done  by  men  and  women  were  different.  Any  gender 
discrimination in these jobs would take the form of segregation within broad occupational 
categories, or of women not being promoted - or choosing not to be promoted. These were 
jobs that were available to  women with education, and some mobility,  as many of them 
would be in the country’s urban centres, and would place those women who obtained these 
jobs in the upper part of the wage distribution. 
However, one could argue that the distribution of “female” jobs in the early era was 
bi-modal. A large proportion of the employed female population at the time was working in 
agriculture either in tea or rubber plantation estates, as labourers/unskilled workers, or in the  
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paddy sector, mainly as unpaid family workers. These sectors continued to have higher than 
average female labour force participation rates, although they have been falling at a faster 
rate than in other sectors (Central Bank 2005b). About 40 percent of female employment in 
the middle of the 1990s was in agriculture, although a shift from agriculture to services was 
evident by the mid-2000s (Central Bank 2005b).
9 
On  the  other  hand,  the  second  wave  of  “female  jobs”  that  were  created  by  the 
opening of the economy were mainly in the Sri Lankan private sector (formal and informal) –
or  in  private  households  overseas.  Wages  in  these  jobs  were  largely  unregulated. 
Goonesekere  (1998)  points  out  that  while  the  gender  equality  clause  in  the  Constitution 
(Article 12) confers a fundamental right to be treated without discrimination in any State 
action, it is considered to cover only the public sector, unless the State has a responsibility 
under law to regulate private sector activity. Despite the latter clause, there has been no 
agreement on this, and “no case has yet been decided to support such an action against 
management in the private sector” (Goonesekere 1998).  
Many of the “female” employment opportunities created since the 1980s were those 
typically found in the lower end of the distribution, and did not necessarily require a high 
level of education, though all of them were characterized by the need for mobility (jobs in the 
export industries were in the urban centers, agricultural employment in settler areas involved 
the mobility  of the  entire  household,  and jobs overseas  required  international  migration). 
Although almost three quarters of employment in the export-oriented Board of Investment 
(BOI) industries was female, these were concentrated in semi-skilled, unskilled and trainee 
positions, while less than one third of supervisory (technical) and a little over one fourth of 
administrative  positions  were  filled  by  women  (BOI  1996).  Similarly,  the  vast  majority  of 
female migrant workers overseas were in jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution.
10 
The  number  of (typically  low-income) females  temporarily  migrating  to work  as  domestic 
workers (housemaids) was larger than the total number of males migrating in any category 
(Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 2002).  
There is evidence that many of the newer jobs are not covered by anti-discriminatory 
regulations. Guneratne (2002) points out that white collar jobs in the private sector are not 
covered  by  regulations,  and  although  minimum  wages  that  do  not  discriminate  between 
males and females in blue-collar jobs are set by Wages Boards organized under the Wages 
Board Ordinance (Chapter 165), a study of industries in the Export Processing Zones has 
cited differential wages among male and female workers for the same task. Moreover, in the 
                                                 
9  Note  however  that  we  do  not  include  the  agriculture  sector  in  our  analysis,  because  earnings 
determination in this sector is quite different from earnings determination in other sectors.  
10 Note that information on their wages is not available in the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 
and they are thus not included in this analysis.  
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tobacco  and  cinnamon  trades,  discriminatory  wages  are  applied  to  men  and  women  at 
present (Guneratne 2002).  
Jayaweera  et  al.  (2000)  note  that  while  the  Wages  Boards  cover  workers  in 
subcontracted  industries,  there  is  a  wide  discrepancy  between  the  law  and  the  reality. 
Although Wages Boards determine remuneration and working hours which extend also to 
contracted labour, weak enforcement and indifference at all levels directly expose workers to 
market forces. Women are especially vulnerable, as they constitute the majority of workers 
in the semi-formal and informal sectors of the economy (Jayaweera et al. 2000). In their 
study of those engaged in the coir industry and in agricultural work among Mahaweli settlers, 
Jayaweera and Sanmugam (1998) note that the working conditions of the coir workers are 
unsatisfactory and they do not have the legal protection given to those in the formal sectors. 
They  are  not  covered  by  laws  and  regulations  regarding  minimum  employment  age 
employment, working hours, occupational health and safety, guarantees of minimum wages, 
or equal remuneration for equal work. 
Despite the improvement in aggregate labour market conditions for females in the 
1980s and 1990s, there is also evidence of stagnating real wages. For example, in a study 
of agricultural wages in the Central Province,  Gunatilaka (2003) found that (female) real 
wages in the tea sector in Kandy and Nuwara Eliya districts and in the paddy sector in the 
Matale and Nuwara Eliya districts stagnated, and increased only in the paddy sector in the 
Kandy district. Moreover, there was little evidence of wage and labour movements in one 
market  affecting  wages  in  the  other,  leading  Gunatilaka  to  conclude  that  there  was 
considerable spatial market segmentation, which could be attributed to “high travel costs, 
lack  of  information  about  casual  employment  opportunities  in  neighbouring  districts,  or 
institutional barriers.  
On the other hand, especially where female workers are concerned, family ties and 
responsibilities, as well as issues of safety may constrain the distance that they can travel in 
search  of  work.”  (Gunatilaka  2003).  Interestingly,  Gunatilaka  (2003)  finds  evidence  of 
integration  across  occupations/labour  markets  within  districts,  but  segmentation  between 
districts. Workers in the tea sector in Nuwara Eliya who are paid less than those in the tea 
sector in Kandy, do not move to Kandy. On the other hand, there was evidence that rising 
masonry wages for unskilled males influenced female wages in the paddy sector in the same 
district. Evidence from other parts of the country indicates that the “shortage” of male labour 
supply in rural areas (because of recruitment into the army) has led to a well-documented 
substitution  of  females  in  hitherto  male  agricultural  tasks,  which  involve  the  use  of 
agricultural machinery such as tractors (Manuratne 1999).  
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The favourable labour market conditions of the 1980s appear to have stabilised in the 
1990s. The female share in the labour force fluctuated from 31 percent to 37 percent in the 
1996-2004 period. Although female unemployment rates declined continuously in the 1990s, 
they have gradually increased since 2001.
11 The proportion of females who are employees 
has remained roughly constant, though fluctuating, over the period. However, the proportion 
of female public sector employees has declined from being about a quarter of all employed 
females (including self-employed and unpaid family workers) to being a quarter of all female 
employees.
12 The proportion of unpaid family workers has declined, which is indicative of the 
increased opportunities for paid work outside of the home that have become available to 
women in Sri Lanka over the last twenty years. 
The  study  focuses  on  the  decade  beginning  in  the  mid-1990s.  Evidence  from 
household survey data indicates that the 1995-2002 period was one of increased growth 
with rising inequality (DCS 2004, World Bank 2007). The picture that emerges from analysis 
is that of a stylised dual economy-type situation with growth taking place predominantly in 
the  manufacturing  sector  and  the  western  provinces,  with  the  other  sectors  and  regions 
lagging behind (World Bank 2007). Little is known about the extent to which women shared 
in the fruits of the uneven growth, and the extent to which gender inequality contributed to 
overall inequality during this period. One might expect that export sector-driven growth would 
have had a positive effect on female employment and wages. At the same time, regional 
disparities  are  likely  to  exacerbate  gender  disparities,  the  relative  immobility  of  women 
translating into their inability to migrate to make use of opportunities and higher wages in the 
developing regions, as noted by Gunatilaka (2003). 
3.  Conceptual framework 
The conventional method of measuring discrimination developed independently by 
Blinder  (1973)  and  Oaxaca  (1973)  assumes  that,  in  the  absence  of  discrimination,  the 
estimated effects of individuals’ observed characteristics are identical for each group. The 
mean wage gap can be decomposed as follows: 
ln w







m      (1) 
where w is a measure of earnings such as the hourly wage; X is a vector of earnings 
                                                 
11 Note however, that despite the rapid increase in female employment in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
female unemployment rate has remained twice as high as the male unemployment rate from the mid 
1980s (21 percent, compared with 11 percent for males) through the 1990s to the current time, and 
unemployment rates for highly educated women are more than double those for similarly educated 
men.  
12  This  is  partly  due  to  the  increase  in  private  sector  employment  following  the  growth  of  the 
manufacturing sector during this period, and partly due to a reduction in public sector hiring as part of 
fiscal discipline measures.  
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characteristics for the ith individual and β is a vector of coefficients; the asterisks on the X 
vectors denote mean characteristics. The first term on the right hand side is the portion due 
to  differences  in  coefficients  (β
m  –  β
f)  ,  evaluated  at  the  same  set  of average  earnings-
generating characteristics (X
*f), in this case the female, and the second term the portion of 
the gap attributed to differences in average earnings-generating characteristics (X
*m – X
*f).  
The decomposition may also be expressed in terms of average male characteristics 
(X
m) as follows: 
ln w




f)  + (X
*m – X
*f)β
f      (2) 
Equation (1) and (2) may be written in several alternative ways depending on the 
assumptions  made  about  the  “true”  wage  structure  in  the  absence  of  discrimination. 
Neumark  (1988)  points  out  that  the  two  specifications  derive  from  distinct  theoretical 
assumptions about the underlying discriminatory behaviour. Using the male wage structure 
as  the  underlying  (discrimination-free)  structure  implies  that  women  are  actively 
discriminated  against,  while  the  assumption  that  the  female  wage  structure  is  the  ‘true’ 
structure implies that all discrimination is “in favour of men”. Reimers (1983) and Cotton 
(1988)  proposed  reference  wage  structures  that  are  weighted  averages  of  the  empirical 
wage structures of males and females.
13 Neumark (1988) proposed the use of a weighting 
matrix derived from the Becker (1971) model of discriminatory tastes, which Oaxaca and 





m) where X and X
m are the matrices of characteristics in the pooled sample and 
in group m, respectively. 
This method focuses on the average wage gap, which follows from the conventional 
approach of estimating Mincerian wage equations by least squares methods, which yields 
estimates of the effects of covariates on the mean of the conditional wage distribution. 
However, the effects of covariates can vary along the conditional wage distribution. 
Quantile regression (QR) analysis introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978) is more flexible 
than  OLS  and  allows  one  to  study  the  effects  of  a  covariate  on  the  whole  conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable. This is particularly useful in the analysis of gender 
wage gaps, because, as Sakellariou (2004) points out, “gender-earnings differentials entail 
much more than the fact that men, on average, earn more than women.” 
Quantile regressions are a natural extension of classical least squares estimation of 
conditional mean models to the estimation of an ensemble of models for conditional quantile 
functions - of which the central special case is the median regression estimator or Least 
                                                 
13 Reimers (1983) proposed equal weights for male and female structures, Cotton (1988) proposed 
weights equal to the relative group size.  
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Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator that minimizes a sum of absolute errors (Koenker and 
Hallock 2000). In contrast to OLS, QR is less sensitive to outliers, and may be more efficient 
than OLS when the error term is non-normal, and may have better properties than OLS in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity (Deaton 1997). As in ordinary least squares regression, 
where the mean of the distribution of the dependent variable, say log wage of worker i, yi is 
modeled conditional on the regressors Xi, where Xi is a vector of covariates representing 
individual characteristics, quantile regressions yield models for different percentiles of the 
distribution. The θth quantile of  yi conditional on Xi is given by 
Qθ (yi|Xi) = Xiβθ , θ ∈ (0,1)          (3) 
where the coefficient βθ is the slope of the quantile line giving the effects of changes 
in X on the θth conditional quantile of y. 
As shown by Koenker and Basset (1978), the quantile regression estimator of βθ 
solves the following minimization problem: 
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Coefficients of quantile regressions are interpreted in the usual way. Standard errors 
are bootstrap standard errors. 
Extending quantile regression analysis to decompose wage gaps requires a decision 
as to where on the covariates distribution the gaps are evaluated. Mueller (1998) and Garcia 
et  al.  (2001)  use  coefficients  from  the  quantile  regressions,  but  evaluate  wage  gaps  by 
combining them with the means of the covariates distributions, which is problematic as the 
mean  covariates  are  unlikely  to  be  representative  of  covariates  at  each  θth  conditional 
quantile  of  y.  Other  approaches  include  using  the  average  characteristics  around  a 
symmetric  neighbourhood  of  every  quantile  (Bishop,  Luo  and  Wang  2005)  or  deriving 
covariates from an auxiliary regression-based framework (Gardeazabal and Ugidos 2005, 
Hyder and Reilly 2006). 
Machado  and  Mata  (2005)  propose  a  method  whereby  the  entire  conditional 
distribution  of  covariates  is  derived.  Their  method  combines  quantile  regression  with  a 
bootstrap approach. Formally, it involves 6 steps. 
1.  Generate a random sample of size n from a U[0,1]: u1…, un.
14 





  ; i =1,…n. 
                                                 
14 In our case, n=5000.  
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3.  Generate for each sample, a random sample of size n, with replacement, from the 
covariates X, denoted by {Xi
m}






n i=1 and {Xi
f β
f }
n i=1  are random samples of size n from the marginal wage 
distributions of y consistent with the linear model defined by (3). 
5.  Generate a random sample of the counterfactual distribution. {Xi
m β
f}
 n i=1 is a random 
sample from the wage distribution that would have prevailed among females if all 
covariates had been distributed as in the male distribution. 
In  order  to  simplify  the  comparison  with  the  Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition,  we 
present the decomposition of the quantiles of the simulated wage distribution as follows, 
where (5), analogous to (1) uses the female characteristics and the male earnings structure 
as the reference, while (6) analogous to (2) is based on male characteristics and the female 
wage structure. 
Qθ (y
m) - Qθ (y
f) = [Qθ (Xi
fβ
m) – Qθ (Xi
f β
f)] + [Qθ (Xi
m β
m) - Qθ (Xi
f β
m) ]  +  residual  (5) 
Qθ (y
m) - Qθ (y
f) = [Qθ (Xi
m β
m) – Qθ (Xi
m β
f)] + [Qθ (Xi
m β
f) - Qθ (Xi
f β
f) ] +  residual  (6) 
The first term on the right hand side is the contribution of the coefficients, and the 
second term is the contribution of the covariates to the difference between the θth quantile of 
the male wage distribution and the θth quantile of the female wage distribution. The residual 
term comprises the simulation errors which disappear with more simulations, the sampling 
errors  which  disappear  with  more  observations,  and  the  specification  error  induced  by 
estimating  linear  quantile  regression  (Melly  2005).
15  We  assume  that  the  linear  quantile 
model is correctly specified.
16 
4.  Data description and raw wage distributions 
4.1  Description of data 
The data used in this study are from the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) 
conducted  by  the  Department  of  Census  and  Statistics.
17  The  survey  covers  the  whole 
island, except the Northern and Eastern provinces which are the two most severely affected 
by  the  armed  conflict  with  the  separatist  Liberation  Tigers  for  Tamil  Eelam  (LTTE) 
movement.
18 The survey schedule is administered to approximately 4,000 housing units per 
                                                 
15 Note that the first two terms on the right hand side in (5) and (6) add up to the same total, which can 
be easily seen as, Qθ (Xi
m β
m) - Qθ (Xi
f β
f). 
16 This is equivalent to defining Qθ (y
m) = Qθ (Xi
m β
m) and Qθ (y
f) = Qθ (Xi
f β
f) then the residual terms in 
equation 5 and 6 are zero by construction. 
17  Links  to  the  QLFS  survey  schedule  and  recent  Annual  Reports  are  available  at 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/samplesurvey/index.htm 
18  The  2003  survey  included  the  Eastern  province  and  the  2004  survey  includes  both  provinces 
except Mullaitivu and Killinochchi districts in the Northern Province; for comparability households in 
the Northern and Eastern provinces are excluded from the 2003 and 2004 samples.  
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quarter. The sample is selected using a two-step stratified random sampling procedure with 
no rotation, and a new random sample is drawn each quarter.
19 
This  study  focuses  on  changes  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  1996-2004 
period.
20 We select two periods: for the first (beginning) period unit records from the 3
rd and 
4
th quarters of the 1996 QLFS were combined with all four quarters of the 1997 QLFS, while 
for the second (ending) period records from all quarters of 2003 were combined with the 1
st 
and 2
nd quarters of 2004.
21 
The sample is selected to include all individuals between the ages of 18 and 58, who 
were  employees  in  their  main  occupation  of  work,  who  were  “usually  employed”  in  the 
previous 12 months,
22 and who had worked at least one hour in the week prior to when the 
survey was administered.
23 We exclude individuals who were self-employed or worked with 
or without pay for a family-operated farm or business, as well as agricultural workers and 
any individuals who were currently attending a school or educational institution. In addition, 
we excluded individuals who claimed to usually work less than 20 or more than 70 hours a 
week.
24 The sample includes formal and informal sector employees, but the data does not 
permit  us  to  identify  formality,  i.e.  no  sample  separation  is  possible.  We  also  exclude 
households in the 2003/2004 samples that are from the Northern and Eastern provinces, in 
order to maintain comparability with the 1996/97 sample.
25 Finally, our sample contains only 
those individuals with nonmissing observations on all the regressors. The selected sample 
comprises a total of 9,834 individuals in the first period and 10,594 individuals in the second 
period.  
Thirty one percent of the pooled sample in both years were female. This is somewhat 
larger than corresponding female shares of wage employees of 20 percent in Egypt in 1990 
(Said 2003) and of 24 - 29 percent in Chile in the 1990-1998 period (Montenegro 2001) but 
smaller than those of 38 - 40 percent in Vietnam in the 1993-2002 period (Pham and Reilly 
2006), and 48 percent in urban China (Bishop, Luo and Wang 2005). Thirty six to thirty eight 
percent of public sector employees and 28 percent of private sector employees were female, 
                                                 
19 Note that the QLFS is not a panel.  
20 The choice of time period is constrained by the availability of data. Although Sri Lankan labour force 
data has been collected in quarterly surveys from 1990, the sampling frame and questionnaire were 
changed,  making  surveys  conducted  before  the  3
rd  quarter  in  1996  incomparable  with  those 
conducted after.  
21 Since the sub-samples of observations in 1996 and 2004 are approximately half the size of the 
other annual sub-samples, they were combined with the annual samples of 1997 and 2003. 
22 Defined (by the DCS) as those who worked for 26 weeks or more during the previous 12 months. 
23 The latter definition corresponds to the DCS definition of those currently employed. 
24 These restrictions are imposed to limit the sample to workers with labour force attachment, and to 
address  any  potential  problems  of  misreporting,  especially  of  hours  worked.  As  a  result  of  the 
relatively high lower bound on hours worked, the sample may underrepresent part time workers.  
25 See footnote 18.  
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compared to the corresponding figures of 12 percent and 3 percent in Pakistan in 2001/02 
(Hyder and Reilly 2007). In Egypt, in 1990, 33 percent of government, 14 percent of public 
enterprise, 21 percent of private sector employees were female (Said 2003).  
Thirty seven percent in 1996/97 and 32 percent in 2003/04 of the total sample of 
employees  were  public  sector  employees,  while  the  corresponding  percentages  in  the 
female sample were 43 percent and 41 percent for 1996/97 and 2003/04 respectively.  
We conduct the analysis separately for public and private sectors. Gender earnings 
differentials could differ between these sectors for a variety of reasons. Compliance with 
equal pay legislation is more likely in the public sector, and wage structures and promotion 
schemes are less likely to leave room for individual variation. On the other hand, the public 
sector is subject to political constraints and not to profit constraints, and any (tastes for) 
discrimination is more likely to persist. Alternatively, whether public sector wage premiums (if 
any) are enjoyed by males or females may be determined by the respective strength of their 
voice within the public sector. 
The  definition  of  earnings  underlying  the  gender  wage  gap  used  throughout  this 
paper is the log of hourly wages from the main occupation where hourly wages is calculated 
as earnings in the last month from the main occupation divided by the hours usually worked 
(at  the  main  occupation)  in  a  month  calculated  as  30/7  multiplied  by  the  hours  usually 
worked in a given week.
26 Nominal values are converted to real terms using the Sri Lanka 
Consumer Price Index (SLCPI) with a base period of 1995-1997 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
2005a).
27 
Schooling  is  defined  into  seven  categories  following  an  ISCED-based
28 
categorisation:  no  schooling  (reference  category),  sub-primary,  completed  primary, 
completed lower secondary, completed O/L, completed A/L and post-secondary; experience 
is years of experience in the current occupation; age is included separately and is measured 
in years. Formal and informal training are included as dummy variables, with no training as 
the reference category. Also included are dummy variables for marital status (1 if currently 
married),  part-time  status  (defined  as  usually  working  less  than  35  hours  a  week)  and 
ethnicity (Tamil, Moor and other, with Sinhala as the reference category). Regional dummy 
variables were included for six of the seven provinces for which data was available, with the 
                                                 
26 Although the questionnaire includes a question on the rupee value of compensation in kind, this 
information is not coded into the raw data tapes. Although roughly 7 percent of the sample said they 
engaged in a secondary occupation, only 1/10
th of that number reported any earnings from it. 
27 The SLCPI is the price index officially used in updating the poverty line, and is based on a national 
consumption  basket  and  includes  price  information  from  all  districts  of  the  country,  unlike  the 
previously used Colombo Consumer’s Price Index (CCPI). 
28  ISCED  stands  for  International  Standard  Classification  of  Education.  For  details  see 
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm   
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Western province as the reference. 
Seven major categories of occupations (ISCO88) are also included. The reference 
category of senior officials and professionals corresponds to high skilled white-collar jobs 
while the second and third categories of technicians and associate professionals and clerks 
correspond to low-skilled white collar jobs. The last four categories are typically low-skilled 
occupations: sales and service workers, craft and related workers and plant and machine 
operators, and those in elementary occupations. Four industrial groups are included. They 
are (1) mining and construction (reference category); (2) manufacturing; (3) electricity water 
and gas, wholesale and retail trade, and the hospitality industries of hotels and restaurants 
and  the  infrastructure  (transport,  communication)  and  finance  sectors;  and  (4)  services, 
including health, education and defence. 
Selectivity issues 
Female labour force participation in Sri Lanka was about 31 percent in the reference 
period which is less than half that of males, and female unemployment in the same period 
was over twice that of males. This raises concerns of selectivity bias which can be present in 
the  labour  force  participation  choice  as  well  as  in  the  form  of  selection  into  wage 
employment.  However,  female  wage  employment  was  approximately  60  percent  of  all 
female employment, while female public sector employment was approximately 27 percent 
of female wage employment.  
Selectivity-correction  techniques  for  mean  regression  are  well-known,  although 
accurate  empirical  estimation  is  often  difficult  owing  to  issues  relating  to  identifying 
instruments  or  exclusion  restrictions.  We  explore  selectivity  within  the  mean  regression 
framework and find no evidence of a selection effect into wage employment for males or 
females.
29 We find some evidence for selectivity into public sector wage employment, while 
evidence  for  selectivity  bias  in  the  private  wage  sector  sample  differs  according  to  the 
method used.
30 
The techniques to correct for selectivity bias in quantile regression models are less 
well  known  and  there  is  little  consensus  regarding  the  most  appropriate  correction 
procedure.  Buchinsky  (2001)  suggests  an  approach  that  adapts  Newey  (1999)  to 
approximate the selection term by a higher order series expansion which is Albrecht et al. 
(2004) and also by Tanuri-Pianto, Pianto and Arias (2004), in their analysis of informal sector 
employment in Bolivia. However this method leads to identification problems relating to the 
wage regression intercept term. Hyder and Reilly (2006) circumvent this by inserting the 
                                                 
29 This is similar to the results of Rama (2003) who used QLFS data from 1995. 
30 For a detailed presentation of the selectivity correction, please see Gunewardena et al. 2007.  
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simple selection term into the quantile regression models, but acknowledge that this is an 
inexact correction for selection bias. 
Given the absence of selectivity bias in our pooled sample estimates, the ambiguous 
evidence for bias in private sector estimates and the relatively small difference in selectivity 
corrected public sector wage gap estimates in our mean regression models, as well as the 
lack of sufficiently good instruments to represent a labour market participation decision in our 
sample,  the  trade-off  in  using  potential  instead  of  actual  experience  in  the  selectivity 
corrected model, and the added complications that arise in correcting for selectivity bias in 
quantile regression models, we decide to proceed without a selection correction procedure in 
either the mean or quantile regression models. Other studies with similar constraints that 
make the same judgement call include de la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2007), Pham and 
Reilly (2006), Newell and Reilly (2001), Montenegro (2001), Said (2003) and Sakellariou 
(2004). 
Furthermore, as de la Rica et al. (2007) argue, selectivity correction would only be 
necessary if one wished to make inference about all women of working age rather than just 
those  in  the  given  sample(s).  We  reiterate  therefore,  that  our  public  and  private  sector 
results  should  be  interpreted  as  being  conditional  on  the  selected  samples.  We  also 
acknowledge that in the absence of selectivity correction, the coefficients in our regressions 
are biased estimates of returns to covariates. Thus, although we use the term ‘returns to 
endowments,’  we  do  so  knowing  that  they  are  the  returns  to  endowments  of  the  given 
samples, and cannot be applied to the working age population in general. 
Descriptive statistics 
The gap in mean log hourly wages was 0.026 (2.6 percent of male wages) and 0.044 
(4.3  percent  of male  wages)  in  1996/97  and  2003/04,  respectively.  However,  the gap  in 
1996/97 was insignificantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, while in 2003/04 the 
gap was significant at the 1 percent level. These are unusual results, with few parallels in the 
empirical  literature.  In  a  survey  of  mean  gender  wage  gaps  for  over  90  country/year 
observations, gaps of less than 5 percent were found only in Argentina in 1995, and Costa 
Rica in 1989, while in Chile in 1996 the gap was 1 percent in favour of females (World Bank 
2001).
31 More recently, Sakellariou (2004) reports an insignificant male-female gap in the log 
of monthly earnings in the Philippines in 1999. In Arulampalam et al.’s study, mean log wage 
gaps  in  eleven  European  countries  ranged  from  0.06  (Italy)  to  0.25  (Britain).  By  way  of 
comparison, the log wage gap in urban China in the 1990s was 0.22 (Bishop et al. 2005) 
                                                 
31 World Bank (2001) reports that hourly female wages in Chile in 1996 were 101 percent of hourly 
male wages. However, in the original source for the Chilean results, Montenegro (2003) reports hourly 
female wages to be 93 percent of hourly male wages in that year and 96 percent for 1998.  
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while in Vietnam mean log wage gaps declined from 0.29 in 1993 to 0.15 in 2002 (Pham and 
Reilly 2006). 
However, disaggregation by sector reveals mean log wage gaps to be very different 
in the private and public sectors. In the public sector wage gaps evaluated at mean log 
hourly wages indicate female hourly wages to be as much as 16 percent higher than male 
hourly wages in 1996/97, and 13 percent higher in 2003/2004. This is an unusual, possibly 
unique,  result,  but  is  not  completely  unexpected,  given  the  relatively  high  productive 
characteristics of females and the potential selection of higher quality females into pubic 
sector employment. The only similar result in the literature is that of the public sector in Italy, 
where public sector mean male log wages are not significantly different from mean female 
log wages (Arulampalam et al. 2006).
32 In the private sector, the mean log wage gap is 19 
percent in 1996/97 and 22 percent of male wages in 2003/04.
33  
Summary statistics of the data are presented by sector and year in Table 2 and 3 
indicate  that  females  have  an  advantage  in  endowments  of  productive  or  earnings-
generating characteristics. A greater percentage of females had A/Level and post-secondary 
education  compared  to  males  in  both  sectors  (and  the  proportion  of  females  with  post-
secondary education in the private sector increases significantly between 1996 and 2004).
34 
While  there  is  no  gender  gap  in  formal  training  in  the  private  sector,  females  have  an 
advantage (40 percent higher proportion) in formal training in the public sector, most likely 
reflecting the training received by teachers (and, to a lesser extent, nurses). While males 
and  females  in  the  public  sector  are  older  than  those  in  the  private  sector,  the  male-
favouring gender age gap is considerably larger (4 years) in the private sector.  
Similarly, the gender gap in occupational experience is much larger (75 percent) in 
the  private  sector.  A  smaller  proportion  of  females  are  married  compared  to  their  male 
counterparts, and the disparity is more evident in the private sector. The great majority of 
females  in  the  private  sector  (over  60  percent)  are  employed  in  manufacturing  (with  a 
significant decline in share between 1996/97 and 2003/04) while in the public sector they are 
mainly (over 80 percent) engaged in the services sector (particularly education and health).
35 
However, while males in the public sector are distributed across occupations, public sector 
females predominate in the professions (close to 50 percent, mainly as teachers) and in the 
                                                 
32  The  only  other  studies  in  the  literature  that  conducted  a  sectorally  disaggregated  analysis  are 
Ganguli and Terrell (2005), and Kee (2006) where mean wage gaps of both sectors are significantly 
different from zero. 
33 Mean gender wage differences within both sectors are all significant at the 1 percent level. 
34 The female advantage in secondary and post-secondary education endowments was also observed 
in the data from the Philippines, Chile, Vietnam, and the Ukraine (Sakellariou 2004, Montenegro 2003, 
Pham and Reilly 2006 and Ganguli and Terrell 2005). 
35 Over 80 percent of public sector males are also engaged in the service sector.  
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occupational categories of associate professionals and clerks (40 percent).
36 The majority of 
private  sector  males  and  females  work  in  two  occupational  categories:  craft  and  related 
workers and elementary occupations. Over 40 percent of private sector females are in this 
category (which includes textile and garments trades workers) compared to 30 percent of 
males, while over 35 percent of males are engaged in elementary occupations compared to 
25 percent of females. Thus, mean characteristics provide an indication that mean wage 
results are likely to be explained by better female endowments. 
We  now  consider  the  entire  raw  wage  distribution.  Figure  1  provides  a  visual 
summary of pooled, public and private sector raw wage distribution in 1996/97 and 2003/04. 






th percentiles for the same samples. These are given as percentages of the 
male wage in Table 6. The first panel in Figure 1 indicates that overall, male and female 
wage  distributions  are  very  different.
37  The  male  distribution  lies  “within”  the  female 
distribution, and is characterised by a higher density function around the mode, and a lower 
dispersion. At the lower quantiles of the distribution, males enjoy an earnings advantage 
over females, while at the 75
th and 90
th percentiles, the advantage is enjoyed by females.
38 
The raw gaps range from 0.22 log hourly wages (20 percent of the male wage) in 2003/04 
and 0.15 (14 percent) in 1996/97 at the 10
th percentile, to a negative (female-favouring) gap 
of 0.15 (16 percent) in the 90
th percentile in both periods. These results are striking, though 
similar to those reported by Sakellariou (2004) for the Philippines in 1999.
39 
Disaggregation  by  sector  indicates that  the falling  wage gap  with  women  earning 
more  than men  at  the higher  end  of the  distribution  is  largely  explained  by  the  sectoral 
composition  of  the  pooled  wage  distribution  (Second  and  third  panels  of  Figure  1).  The 
female public sector wage distribution lies almost entirely to the right of the corresponding 
male wage distribution, while the female private sector wage distribution lies to the left of the 
private sector male wage distribution. We are not aware of any other studies/countries where 
higher female wages are indicated throughout the public sector distribution.
40 We suspect 
                                                 
36 This is consistent with results of the 1998 Census of Public and Semi-Government Employees 
which indicate that relatively few females are employed in the lower-paying occupational categories in 
the  public  sector  (Elementary  occupations,  Machine  Operators  and  Related  workers,  Craft  and 
Related Workers and Sales and Service workers) (Department of Census and Statistics 2001). 
37 The density functions in Figure 1 were estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel estimator. 
38 Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicated that for all sectors and years, male and female distributions were 
significantly different from each other. Tests of differences between periods indicated that distributions 
were different except in the case of private sector females. 
39 Although the mean raw wage gap for Chile was similar in magnitude to ours, the Chilean raw wage 
distribution  is  characterised  by  gaps  that  increase  throughout  the  wage  distribution  (Montenegro 
2003).  
40 Neither Sakellariou (2004) nor Montenegro (2003), whose pooled results are very similar to ours, 
disaggregate their samples by sector, and thus we do not know if similar results might have been 
found in the Philippines and in Chile.   
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this result may be due to the better endowments of women in the public sector relative to 
men, as well as the gender composition of occupations in the public sector, where women 
work mainly in the professional, technical, and clerical occupations. It is also consistent with 
the selection of ‘higher quality’ women into public sector wage employment.
41 





th  and  90
th  percentiles,  indicating  negative  (female  favouring)  raw  wage  gaps 
throughout the public sector and positive (male favouring) raw wage gaps throughout the 
private sector in both periods.
42 Sectoral raw gaps display considerable variation along the 
distribution as well. Public sector raw wage gaps decline (become more negative or female-
favouring) until about the median and then rise marginally (become less negative), while 
private sector wage gaps display a more complex behaviour. In 1996/97, they fall initially 
(between the 10
th and 25
th quantiles), but rise thereafter (upto the 75
th quantile) and then 
decrease (90
th quantile). In 2003/04, they show the same pattern at the lower quantiles, 
rising  between  the  25
th  and  50
th  quantile,  but  then  fall  continuously  thereafter).  Figure  2 
through  3  depict  the  raw  gaps  (dashed-dotted  line)
43  which  are  calculated  at  every  5
th 
percentile. 
The change in the mean raw gender wage gap from 1996/97 to 2003/04 was quite 
small - from an insignificant gap in 1996/97 to a very small overall gap of 4.3 percent of the 
male wage in 2003/04. This indicates that the gender wage gap has not contributed in a 
major  way  to  the  increase  in  inequality  during  this  period. This  is  not unusual.  In  urban 
China, for example, the gender wage gap increased by one percentage point during a period 
of 25 percent increase in earnings inequality (Bishop, Luo and Wang 2005) while in Vietnam 
gender disparities decreased during a period of relatively high inequality (Pham and Reilly 
2006). 
Sectoral changes within Sri Lankan wage employment indicate that private sector 
gender wage gaps increased from 19 to 22 percent, while public sector gender wage gaps 
fell from 16 to 13 percent of the male wage. Further disaggregation indicates the largest 
increases to be at the 25
th and 50
th percentile of the private sector which rose from 17 and 
18 percent to 22 and 23 percent of the male wage gap, driving the increase in the pooled 
wage gap at the 10
th and 25
th percentiles which rose from 14 and 10 percent to 20 and 15 
percent  of  the  male  wage  gap.  The  magnitude  of  these  changes  is  not  considerable, 
                                                 
41 See footnote 36 for more information on public sector occupational categories. Note that we draw 
inference  only  for  the  existing  public  sector  wage  employees’  sample,  and  not  for  all  women  of 
working age. 
42 These differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
43  Note  that  the  raw  gaps  shown  in  Figure  3  and  5  are  the  same  as  those  shown  in 
Figure 2 and 4, respectively.  
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indicating that changes in wage inequality among men and women did not play a large part 
in the changes in overall income inequality that were observed during this period. However, 
it is a cause for concern that the divergence in wages occurred at the point where gender 
wage gaps are largest.  
To  summarise,  raw  wage  gaps  indicate  that  women  fare  worse  than  men  at  the 
bottom of the pooled distribution, while women appear to fare better than men at the top of 
the  pooled  distribution.  Sectoral  disaggregation  indicates  that  this  is  entirely  driven  by 
women  doing  better  than  men  throughout  the  public  sector  and  worse  than  men  in  the 
private sector. At this point, we surmise that this is because women in the public sector are 
better  endowed  relative  to  men,  compared  with  the  private  sector.  Changes  over  time 
indicate a moderate worsening of the wage gap at the bottom of the pooled distribution. 
5.  Decomposition results 
In order to decompose the differences in raw wage distribution into differences in 
coefficients  (returns)  and  in  characteristics  (attributes),  the  Oaxaca  and  Blinder 
decomposition and the Machado and Mata decompositions are applied to estimates derived 
from mean and quantile regression. Two specifications are used. In the first specification, the 
vector  of  regressors  includes  age  and  occupational  experience  (both  in  quadratic  form), 
dummy variables for education, whether any (formal/informal) training is received, ethnicity, 
marital status, and region. The second specification also included dummy variables for part-
time status, seven occupational categories and four industrial categories. Goodness of fit 
statistics are similar to results reported in similar studies (Pham and Reilly 2006, Ganguli 
and Terrell 2005, Bishop, Luo and Wang 2005).
44 
Decomposition results are summarized in the second and third panels of Table 4 
(1996/97) and 5 (for 2003/04), and presented graphically in figues 2 and 3 for 1996/97, and 
in Figure 4 and 5 for 2003/04. The ‘estimated’ wage gap presented in the second and third 
panels of the tables and as the solid line in the figures is the ‘unexplained’ wage gap, or the 
part that remains once covariates are controlled for i.e., the component of the wage gap 
decomposition  due  to  differences  in  ‘returns’  to  endowments.  It  is  presented  in  both  its 
forms, i.e. evaluated at male characteristics [Xm( βm - βf)] and at female characteristics [Xf ( 
βm - βf)]. For OLS, this is the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, evaluated at mean 
characteristics. For the quantiles, the results are obtained following the procedure used by 
Machado and Mata (2005). Note that the interpretation of the estimated wage gap when 
evaluated at male (female) characteristics is the difference between the actual male (female) 
                                                 
44 Please see Gunewardena et al. 2007, Appendix 2, tables A2.1-A2.12 for a detailed presentation of 
the results.  
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wage distribution and the male (female) wage distribution if males (females) were paid like 
females  (males),  or  alternatively,  if  females  (males)  had  the  identical  characteristics  as 
males (females), but were still paid like females (males). In addition to the point estimate of 
the estimated wage gap, the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimate and the 
raw gap are also presented in the figures for ease of comparison.  
Results based on model 1: excluding controls for part-time status, occupation and industry 
The results based on the specification which excludes controls for part-time status, 
occupation and industry are discussed first. This is our preferred model because part-time 
status, occupation, and industry are choice variables that are arguably endogenous.
45 
Mean conditional gaps 
The first column in both Table 4 and 5 gives the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, and 
indicates  that  once  characteristics  are  controlled  for,  the  estimated  (unexplained)  mean 
wage gap is positive (male- favouring), even where the raw gap was negative. These results 
are similar to Montenegro (2003) for Chile and Sakellariou (2004) for the Philippines. The 
(unexplained) estimated gap is smaller in the public sector than in the private sector. These 
are similar to Arulampalam et al.’s (2006) results for nine out of eleven European countries 
and Kee’s (2006) results for Australia, and in contrast to Ganguli and Terrell’s (2005) results 
for Ukraine. The figures in the second panel of Table 6 give the proportion of the raw gap 
that is due to differences in returns as a percentage.
  46 This indicates that in the pooled 
sample, over 100 percent of the gap (in fact, 340 percent of it) is due to the existence of 
“discrimination:” in the absence of “discrimination”, females would earn more than males. 
These results are consistent with (though of a larger magnitude than) previous results for Sri 
Lanka (Ajwad and Kurukulasuriya 2002, and Gunewardena 2002) and similar to Blau and 
Kahn’s  (2003)  results  for  UK  (1985-1994),  New  Zealand  (1991-94),  Bulgaria  (1992-93), 
Israel (1993-94), Poland (1991-94) and Slovenia (1991-94); to Glinskaya and Mroz’s (2000) 
results for the Russian Federation (1994) to Birdsall and Behrman’s (1991) results for Brazil 
(1970) to Psacharapoulos and Tzannatos’ (1992) results for Chile (1987), Honduras (1989), 
Jamaica (1989) to Meng and Miller’s (1995) results for China in 1985, to Horton’s (1996) 
results for the Philippines (1978 and 1988)
47 and to Montenegro’s (2003) results for Chile 
(1992-1998). 
When  the  sample  is  disaggregated  by  sector,  almost  100  percent  of  the  private 
                                                 
45 One could argue that the way in which discrimination operates is in the tracking of females into low 
paying occupations and industries or part-time work, and that therefore any estimates that control for 
these factors would then underestimate discrimination. 
46 This is calculated on the assumption that the residual in (5) and (6) is zero. 
47 Cited in World Bank (2001), Appendix 3, p. 301-306.  
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sector gap is due to the difference in coefficients, which is similar to Blau and Kahn’s (2003) 
results  for  Ireland  (1988-90,  1993-94)  the  United  States  (1985-94),  the  Czech  Republic 
(1992,  1994),  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Germany  (1990-93),  Hungary  (1988-94),  the 
Russian  Federation  (1991-94)  and  Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos’  (1992)  results  for 
Venezuela (1989). 
On the other hand, the female-favouring gap in the public sector, like that in the 
pooled  sample,  is  more  than  entirely  explained  by  the  difference  in  characteristics  (i.e. 
females have more favourable characteristics at the mean than male). 
Estimated wage gaps across the distribution 
The second to sixth columns of tables 4 and 5 (panel 2) and the solid line in figures 2 
and 4 provide the results of the Machado-Mata decomposition.  
The estimated wage gap in both years is positive at every quantile in the pooled 
distribution, indicating that females are underpaid (or males are overpaid) throughout the 
distribution.
48  Moreover,  it  lies  clearly  above  the  raw  wage  gap  over  a  large  part  of  the 
distribution (Figure 2 and Figure 4).
49 Table 6 indicates that over 100 percent of the positive 
(male-favouring) raw wage gap (from the 10
th percentile to the median) is unexplained, while 
the negative (female-favouring) raw wage gap in the upper part of the distribution is largely 
explained  by  better  female  endowments.
50  This  indicates  that  women  have  better 
characteristics throughout the earnings distribution and, in the absence of discrimination, 
would have earned more than men. These results are similar to Arulampalam et al.’s (2006) 
results for Belgium, Finland, France, Italy and Spain, Montenegro’s (2003) results for Chile 
and Sakellariou’s (2004) results for the Philippines.
51 
While public sector results are similar in this last respect to pooled sample results
52, 
in the private sector the estimated wage gap coincides almost entirely with the raw wage gap 
(right-most panels of Figures 2 and 4) indicating that close to 100 percent of the wage gap is 
unexplained. This indicates that women in the private sector have similar characteristics to 
men, and in the absence of discrimination women would have earned the same as men. 
These results are similar to Arulampalam et al.’s (2006) disaggregated results for Belgium, 
France, Ireland and Spain, where estimated public sector wage gaps are higher than raw 
                                                 
48 Except at the 90
th percentile, when evaluated at male characteristics, in 1996/97. 
49 Above the 40
th percentile of the pooled distribution. 
50 Except in the case of the raw median wage gap in 1996/97 where only 72 percent and 96 percent 
are explained. 
51  Note  however  that  negative  (female-favouring)  raw  gaps  are  observed  only  in  the  Philippines 
(Sakellariou 2004) and Chile (Montenegro 2003). 
52 The estimated wage gap is larger than the raw wage gap up to the 85
th percentile of the public 
sector distribution.  
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wage gaps, while in the private sector raw wage gaps lie within the confidence intervals of 
the estimated wage gaps. 
While  the  estimated  wage  gap  is  positive  throughout  the  pooled  and  private 
distributions, in the public sector it remains negative (female-favouring) at the median and at 
the 75
th percentile. Thus, although the estimated wage gap is smaller (in absolute terms) 
than the raw wage gap, indicating that a large part of the female-favouring wage gap is due 
to better female characteristics (Tables 4 to 6), there remains an unexplained component of 
the gap that disadvantages males at the median and above.
53  
The results described above are robust to the choice of whether gaps are evaluated 
at male or female characteristics. However, magnitudes of estimated gaps differ between 
these sets of estimates. In both years, a slightly larger proportion of the gap at the bottom of 
each distribution is unexplained when  we use the female structure (male characteristics) 
than  the  male  structure  (female  characteristics).  Breunig  and  Rospabe  (2005)  obtain  a 
similar result in their analysis of wages in France and interpret it as indicating that there are 
likely to be more unobservable factors that influence women’s choice of work than men’s. 
However, the opposite is true at the top of the Sri Lankan wage distribution, in 1996/97, 
indicating, by the same logic, more unobservable factors influencing men’s choice of work 
than  women’s.  This  result  challenges  conventional  thinking  about  selection  as  an  issue 
related to females only, indicating as it does that there are unobservables that affect men’s 
choice of work as well. Disparities in magnitude of estimates are much smaller in 2003/04, 
indicating that selection is less of an issue in 2003/04. 
What light do the decompositions shed on the observed divergence in raw wages at 
the  bottom  of  the  distribution  between  1996/97  and  2003/04?  Here,  the  results  differ 
depending on whether male or female structure (or conversely, characteristics) is used. If 
women were paid like men, the increase in raw wage gaps at the bottom of the pooled 
distribution and at the 25
th and median of the private sector distribution could be attributed to 
difference in returns to endowments, whereas if men were paid like women, the increase in 
raw wages could be attributed to changes in endowments.  
Finally,  does  the  QR-based  decomposition  provide  more  information  than  mean 
decomposition? What  can  we  conclude  about  the  existence  of  sticky floors  and/or glass 
ceilings? Figure 2 and 4 indicate that OLS underestimates the conditional wage gap at the 
bottom of the pooled distribution and overestimates it at the top. There is clear evidence of a 
falling wage gap throughout the distribution, when the estimated wage gap is evaluated at 
male  characteristics,  and  evidence  of  a falling gap  up  to the median when  evaluated  at 
                                                 
53 Note that this feature is not captured by the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of wages at the mean.  
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female characteristics. Thus, there appears to be ‘sticky floors’ for women in the Sri Lankan 
wage employment market, i.e the wage gap between otherwise identical men and women is 
greater at the bottom of the wage distribution.  
However,  is  this  ‘sticky  floor’  simply  a  manifestation  of  a  ‘sticky  door’  i.e.  is  it 
completely explained by sectoral stratification, where the public sector wage distribution lies 
above  the  private  sector  wage  distribution?  If  this  were  so,  we  would  expect  public  and 
private sector-estimated wage gaps to be flat across their respective distributions. Rather, 
we  find  that  in  the  public  sector,  the  quantile  regression-based  decomposition  clearly 
provides more information about the distribution of the conditional wage gap than the OLS-
based decomposition, while in the private sector, the result differs between years. In 2003/04 
(Figure 4) the quantile regression estimates of the conditional wage gap do not significantly 
differ  from  the  conditional  mean  wage  gap,  except  around  the  10
th  percentile  (when 
evaluated  at  male  characteristics),  whereas  in  1996/97  (Figure  2)  there  is  a  difference 
between QR and OLS estimates of the unexplained gap below the 30
th percentile and above 
the 80
th percentile, when evaluated at male characteristics and between the 20
th and 30
th 
percentiles and above the 65
th percentile, when evaluated at female characteristics. 
Among developing county studies, the result of falling wage gaps in the conditional 
distribution is also reported for Vietnam in the 1993-2002 period (Pham and Reilly 2006) and 
over most of the distribution for the Philippines in 1999 (Sakellariou 2004) although not for 
Montenegro (2003), where conditional wage gaps rise throughout the distribution. 
Results based on model 2: including controls for part-time status, occupation and industry  
Duncan  and  Duncan  (1955)  dissimilarity  (D)  indices for  Sri  Lanka for this  period, 
based on an aggregated categorization of ten occupational categories, indicate that 15 to 20 
percent of women (or men) have to change occupations in order to equalize female and 
male occupational distributions. When the number of categories is more finely disaggregated 
into 39 categories, the D index increases to 44 percent (Gunewardena et al. 2006). This 
suggests that occupational differences may explain gender wage gaps. 
So we include controls for part-time status, occupation and industry to examine to 
what extent they explain the wage gap and present the results in panel 3 in tables 4 and 5, 
and  in  figures  3  and  5.  Many  of  the  results  discussed  previously  do  not  change  after 
introducing controls for part-time status, occupation and industry: (1) women continue to be 
underpaid  (men  overpaid)  throughout  the  overall  distribution;  (2)  estimated  wage  gaps 
continue to be larger than the raw in the pooled and public sector distributions, indicating 
that  in  the  absence  of  discrimination  women  would  earn  more  than  men,  even  after 
controlling for occupation, industry and part-time status; (3) in the private sector distribution,  
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estimated  wage  gaps  are  equal  to  raw  wage  gaps,  indicating  that  in  the  absence  of 
discrimination women would earn the same as men, even after controlling for occupation, 
industry and part-time status; (4) the explanation for the increase in raw gaps at the bottom 
of the distribution is similar to that when controls are not used;
54 and (5) pooled and public 
sectors continue to indicate a ‘sticky floor’ although the conditional mean gap provides a 
good estimate of the conditional wage gap across the distribution only in the 2003/04 sample 
when evaluated at female characteristics.  
However, unexplained (estimated) wage gaps are larger when occupation, industry 
and part-time status are controlled for, than when they are excluded.
55 The magnitude of 
increase is sufficiently large that the negative estimated wage gaps in the upper part of the 
distribution in the public sector become positive. These results are consistent with the idea of 
females selecting into occupations and industries, and choosing hours of work that reward 
their  characteristics  better,  and  is  not  consistent  with  the  more  commonly  observed 
explanation  of  occupational  segregation  where  females  are  tracked  into  lower  paying 
occupations and industries. These results are unusual; for eg. Arulampalam et al. (2006) find 
that  either  the  results  do  not  change,  or  ‘glass  ceilings’  disappear,  when  controls  for 
occupation  and  industry  are  included.  Albrecht  et  al.  (2003)  find  that  controlling  for 
occupation  substantially  reduces  the  gender  gap  throughout  the  wage  distribution. 
Sakellariou finds that “women are heavily favoured in their returns to …occupation across 
the entire earnings distribution”, which is consistent with a narrowing of the wage gap when 
occupational controls are included.
56 Thus, it appears that while Sri Lankan women are able 
to chose occupations (industries, flexibility of status) in which their (better) characteristics are 
rewarded better, within these broad occupational categories or occupations they continue to 
be underpaid. The larger disparity within, rather than between, occupations is explained by 
the fact that men hold the jobs that pay better within these occupations (industries) e.g. while 
71 percent of school teachers and garment industry employees are female, only 21 percent 
of school principals are women, and only 26 percent of employees in adminstration in the 
garment industry are women (Department of Census and Statistics 2001, Sri Lanka Bureau 
of Foreign Employment 2002). 
                                                 
54 It would be attributed to difference in returns to endowments, whereas if men were paid like women, 
the increase in raw wages would be due to changes in endowments. 
55 Except in the private sector, 10
th percentile in 1996/97 and 90
th percentile in 2003/04. 
56 Arulampalam et al. (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2003) conduct a similar exercise to ours, comparing 
sets  of  estimates  with  and  without  occupational  controls,  while  Sakellariou  has  a  single  set  of 
estimates that include occupational dummies and his conclusion is based on the coefficients on these 
variables.  Albrecht  et  al.  (2003)  find  their  results  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  107  occupational 
dummies. Our results may be due to the fact that we use fewer controls: 7 occupational categories 
and 4 industrial categories, but this is roughly comparable to the level of aggregation in Arulampalam 
et al. (2006).  
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When  we  include  controls  for  occupation,  industry  and  part-time  status,  a  larger 
proportion of the gap is unexplained when we use the female structure (male characteristics) 
than the male structure (female characteristics) throughout all three distributions, indicating 
that there are likely to be more unobservable factors that influence women’s choice of work 
within broad occupational and industrial categories than men’s.  
Table 7 provides a summary of the results in terms of sticky floors and glass ceilings. 
We use two alternative conditions to define a ‘glass ceiling’: if the 90
th percentile estimated 
wage  gap  is  larger  than  that  at  the  75
th  percentile  or  that  at  the  50
th  percentile,  by  4 
percentage points.
 57 ‘Sticky floors’ are defined in three ways: if the 10
th percentile estimated 
wage  gap  is  larger  than  every  other  single    estimated  wage  gap,  the  75
th  percentile 
estimated wage gap, or the estimated wage gap at the median, by 4 percentage points.
 
Columns 7 and 14  in Table 7 indicate the range of the estimated wage gap across the 
distribution and columns 6 and 13 indicate whether the profile of the estimated wage gap is 
monotonically increasing or decreasing along the distribution. 
The table indicates that none of the distributions are monotonically increasing in the 
estimated wage gap, and only the pooled distribution - evaluated at male characteristics - is 
monotonically  decreasing.  However,  by  the  other  three  definitions  used,  there  is  clear 
evidence for a ‘sticky floor’ in the 2003/04 data, robust to either model specification and to 
whether  male  or  female  characteristics  are  used  to  evaluate  the  gap  in  the  absence  of 
discrimination. In the public sector too, there is evidence of a sticky floor in both years. In the 
private sector, a sticky floor is evident in 2003/04, only when the weakest definition (10
th 
percentile greater than the median) is used, evaluated at male characteristics, but there is 
stronger evidence for a sticky floor in 1996/97. In both public and private sectors, there is 
also some evidence of a ‘glass ceiling’, when estimated wage gaps are evaluated at female 
characteristics in 1996/97. Thus, it appears that sticky floors predominate in the Sri Lankan 
wage market for women, and are not simply a manifestation of occupational segregation or 
sectoral stratification (sticky doors). 
6.  Conclusions, policy implications, limitations of the study and future work 
This paper analyses changes in gender wage gaps throughout the wage distribution 
in Sri Lanka using individual data from the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) and a 
quantile regression approach for the two end-points of the 1996-2004 period. The analysis is 
conducted separately for the public and private sectors as well as on a pooled sample.  
                                                 
57 The value of 4 percentage points is derived from the confidence intervals in our results. At four 
points, any such differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance.  
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The gap in mean log hourly wages was 0.026 (2.6 percent of male wages) and 0.044 
(4.3 percent of male wages) in 1996/97 and 2003/04, respectively. However, there are large 
differences in unconditional mean gender wage gaps across sectors, with a mean female 
private  sector  wage  that  is  approximately  80  percent  of  the  mean  male  wage,  and, 
somewhat unexpectly, a public sector mean female wage that was 13-16 percent higher 
than the public sector mean male wage. 






indicate  that  the  mean  gender  wage  gap  hides  a  large  variation  in  the  gap  across  the 
distribution,  and  that  these  gaps  are  very  different  in  the  public  and  private  sectors. 
Unconditional wage gaps throughout the wage distribution in the public sector favour women 
and range from an 8 to 9 percent lower male wage in the tails of the distribution to a 17 to 20 
percent lower male wage in the middle of the distribution. Unconditional private sector wage 
gaps are largest at the bottom (male wages are 31 percent higher than female wages) and 
smallest at the top (male wages are 23 percent higher than female wages).  
Changes  over  the  1996/97-2003/04  period  indicated  the  largest  increase  in 
unconditional wage gaps to have occurred at the bottom of the wage distribution, where 
unconditional wage gaps are largest. 
Counterfactual decompositions based on quantile regression show that women are 
underpaid (and men overpaid) at every quantile in the wage distribution, that in the absence 
of  ‘discrimination’  women  would  earn  more  than  men  in  the  pooled  and  public  sector 
distributions, and that ‘discrimination’ accounts for the entire wage gap in the private sector. 
This indicates that despite better characteristics, women are disadvantaged in the labour 
market. 
The  female  advantage  in  the  public  sector  raw  wage  distribution  gives  way  to  a 
significant male advantage in the conditional wage distribution, when occupation, industry 
and part-time status are controlled for. Conditional wage gaps are smaller (though still larger 
than  unconditional  wage  gaps),  and  public  sector  wage  gaps  in  the  upper  part  of  the 
distribution remain negative, when these choice variables are excluded from the regressors, 
which  is  consistent  with  a  scenario  where  females  select  into  occupations  where  their 
characteristics are rewarded better, and is not consistent with the concept of occupational 
segregation. 
There is evidence of a ‘sticky floor’ in the public sector, and in the pooled distribution, 
for both periods and model specifications. The private sector estimated wage gap is largely 
constant  over  the  distribution  in  2003/04,  but  there  is  evidence  for  both  sticky  floors 
(evaluated at male characteristics) and ‘glass ceilings’ (evaluated at female characteristics)  
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in 1996/97. There is also some evidence to support the existence of a glass ceiling in the 
public sector in 1996/97 when evaluated at female characteristics.  
Interpretations of these results are conditional on the selected sample we have used, 
but  we  put  forward  some  tentative  explanations  for  our  results  and  suggest  policy 
recommendations. Firstly, we see that in all three samples, and for most of the distribution, 
conditional  wage  gaps  were  larger  than  unconditional  wage  gaps.  Two  explanations  are 
possible.  One  is  the  existence  of  discrimination,  either  “for”  men,  or  actively  “against” 
women.
58 The other relates to model specification. Suppose our model suffers from omitted 
variable  bias;  for  example,  we  do  not  account  for  raw  ability.  For  this  to  result  in  an 
overestimate of the conditional wage gap, ability would have to have a skewed distribution - 
men  would  have  to  have  more  of  it  and  women  less  of  it.  This  is  clearly  an  untenable 
argument.  
However, a less implausible version of the argument might define ability to include 
those characteristics that enable men to compete better in the labour market, particularly in a 
society such as Sri Lanka’s where women have less mobility and a greater responsibility for 
child-rearing (which restricts them from working late hours, travelling on the job, moving to 
towns  where  jobs  are  better  paying,  etc.).  Ability  may  also  be  defined  as  lacking  the 
characteristics that enable a good “fit” into the workplace—in a society where “most formal 
organizations  are  masculine  in  nature”  (Wickramasinghe  and  Jayatilaka  2006).  These 
factors lead to women being paid less for a variety of reasons (they do not get hired into 
better  paying  jobs,  they  are  overlooked  for  promotion,  alternatively  they  self-select  into 
convenient,  but  low  paying jobs,  etc.). If  this  explanation  was  accurate,  it  would  support 
Wickramasinghe and Jayatilaka’s (2006) assertion that “public expenditure on education is 
underutilized due to gender bias and stereotyping of women”. 
Thus,  important  policy  options  must  include  not  merely  the  standard  policies  to 
improve women’s productive characteristics (which in current day Sri Lanka would refer to 
increasing  women’s  human  capital  in  technical  fields  where  they  still  lag  behind  at  the 
tertiary  education  level)  but  policies  that  promote  gender  equity  in  hiring,  and  in  the 
workplace (eg. Day-care centers and crèches at the work place, introduction of parental 
leave, compliance with maternity regulations) which in turn will reduce time spent out of the 
labour force by women. In this regard, we value the contribution made by the “Guidelines for 
Company Policy on Gender Equity/Equality” promoted by the ILO/EFC.
59 However, policy 
                                                 
58 The size of the conditional wage gap evaluated at men’s characteristics does not differ significantly 
from women’s characteristics indicating that either of these types of discrimination could be at work. 
59 Several of these policies are promoted in ILO/EFC (2005).  
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options would need to step out of the marketplace and into the household in order to enable 
women to access the “omitted variables” that keep them in low-paying jobs.  
The second important finding of this study is that there are ‘sticky floors,’ i.e. larger 
conditional wage gaps at the bottom of the distribution, in all three samples. This is important 
from equity, efficiency and poverty-reduction perspectives. Strategies to reduce poverty and 
break the link between gender and poverty tend to be concentrated on improving access to 
credit and information for self-employed females. While this is undoubtedly important, we 
believe this study has shown that gender wage disparities hurt the poor the most. Thus, 
policies  that  address  gender  disparities  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution  are  needed.  A 
directly  applicable  policy  recommendation  would  be  “to  rectify  existing  gender-based 
anomalies in the wages of employees in manual labour and subcontracting” (ILO/EFC 2005).  
However,  less  obvious  policy  applications  of  the  sticky  floor  result  from  these 
policies. For example, there is ample evidence that female wages among the lowest paying 
occupations  (eg.  Domestic  servants)  have  risen  in  the  last  two  decades  in  response  to 
labour supply shortages arising from the removal of restrictions on overseas employment. 
Any  attempt  to  restrict  female  migration  for  employment  overseas  would  only  serve  to 
worsen wage offers for women in the local market. As such, we view the recent bill that 
seeks to prevent women with young children (below the age of five) from going overseas for 
employment as a retrogressive step. Similarly, any form of labour market restriction such as 
the controversial Termination of Workers Act (TEWA) is likely to exert a downward pressure 
on  women’s  wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution  by  encouraging  firms  that  would 
potentially hire these women to remain informal.
60 
Finally, our study finds evidence that is consistent with women selecting into “better 
paying” occupations. Our descriptive statistics revealed that most women in the public sector 
were clerks, teachers and nurses, while most women in the private sector with slightly better 
educational  qualifications  were  in  the  textile  and  garment  trades,  as  opposed  to  being 
constrained to work in elementary occupations. While these women are paid less than their 
male counterparts within these occupations and industries (because the school principals 
and factory supervisors continue to be males) they are nevertheless better paid than women 
in other occupations and industries. This has implications for the impact on the wage gap 
following  public  sector  downsizing  and  the  expected  contraction  in  the  garment  industry 
following the ending of the quota.  
The limitations of our study are highlighted in the previous discussion. We do not 
correct for selectivity  bias  or  address  endogeneity  issues.  Moreover,  the  ‘segregation’  of 
                                                 
60 Vodopivec (2006) shows that TEWA has a restrictive effect on firm size.  
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women into a few occupations and the inability to control for jobs (i.e. principals vs. teachers 
and supervisors vs. factory workers) indicate the lack of a common support between the 
male and female wage distributions. While we  are aware that the literature on matching 
functions uses non-parametric methods to address this issue (Nopo 2004, Djurdjevic and 
Radyakin 2005) we consider this to be outside the scope of this study, and refer to such as 
areas for future research. 
Although several of our results were different from those typically found in similar 
studies  of  labour  markets  in  developed  countries,  we  found  similarities  with  studies 
conducted using data from Chile (Montenegro 2003) and the Philippines (Sakellariou 2004). 
We agree with Sakellariou (2004) that the generation of more country studies to form a 
larger body of empirical evidence can confirm or contradict the results we have found as 
having general applicability.  
  32 
References 
Ajwad, M.J. and P. Kurukuasuriya. 2002. “Ethnic and Gender Wage Disparities in Sri Lanka”, 
Sri Lanka Economic Journal, 3 (1) 
Albrecht, James, Anders Bjorklund, and Susan Vroman. 2003. “Is There a Glass Ceiling in 
Sweden?”, Journal of Labour Economics 21 (1): 145-177. 
Arulampalam, Wiji, Alison L. Booth and Mark L. Bryan. 2006. “Is there a Glass Ceiling over 
Europe? Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across the Wages Distribution”, Discussion 
Paper No. 510, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social 
Science, Australia National University.  
Aturupane, Harsha. 1996. “Is education more profitable for women? An economic analysis of 
the impact of schooling on the earnings of men and women in Sri Lanka” Sri Lanka 
Journal of Social Sciences 1996 19(1 & 2): 27-45 
Becker, G. 1971. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Birdsall, Nancy and Jere Behrman. 1991. “Why do Females Earn More than Males in Urban 
Brazil: Earnings Discrimination or Job Discrimination?” in Nancy Birdsall and Richard 
Sabot, eds. Unfair Advantage: Labor Market Discrimination in Developing Countries. 
A World Bank Regional and Sectoral Study. Washington, D.C. 
Bishop, John A., Feijun Luo and Fang Wang. 2005. “Economic transition, gender bias, and 
the distribution of earnings in China” Economics of Transition 13(2):239-259.  
Blau, Francine and Lawrence Kahn. 2003. “Understanding International Differences in the 
Gender Pay Gap.” Journal of Labor Economics 21(1): 106-144 
Blinder, Alan. 1973. "Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural estimates." Journal of 
Human Resources 18 (Fall): 436-455. 
Breunig, Robert and Sandrine Rospabe. 2005. “Parametric vs. semi-parametric estimation of 
the male-female wage gap: An application to France”. Mimeo. Australian National 
University. 
Buchinsky,  M.  1994.  “Changes  in  the  U.S.  wage  structure  1963-1987:  an  application  of 
quantile regression.” Econometrica 62:405-458. 
Buchinsky, M. 1998. “Recent advances in quantile regression models.” Journal of Human 
Resources, 33:88-126. 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2005a. Annual Report 2004. Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2005b. Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Survey Report,  
Part 1 2003/04. Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 2002. Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
U.N. Doc. A/57/38 (Part I), paras. 256-302. 
Cotton, J. 1988. On the Decomposition of Wage Differentials. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 70: 236-243. 
Deaton,  Angus.  1997.  The  Analysis  of  Household  Surveys.  Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins 
University Press. 
De la Rica, Sara, Juan J. Dolado and Vanessa Llorens. 2007. “Ceilings and Floors: Gender 
Wage Gaps by Education in Spain”. Forthcoming. Journal of Population Economics. 
Department of Census and Statistics. 1996-2004. Quarterly Reports of the Sri Lanka Labour 
Force Survey. Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics.  
  33 
Department of Census and Statistics. 2001. Census of Public and Semi-Government Sector 
Employment 1998. Colombo. 
Department  of  Census and  Statistics  of  Sri  Lanka.  2004.  Final  Report  of the  Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey 2002, Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
Djurdjevic, Dragana, and Sergiy Radyakin. 2005. “Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap 
Using  Matching:  An  Application  for  Switzerland.”  Darmstadt  Discussion  Papers  in 
Economics. No. 155. 
Fitzenberger,  Bernard,  R.  Koenker  and  Jose  Machado.  2001.  Economic  Applications  of 
Quantile Regression. Studies in Empirical Economics Springer-Verlag.  
Fortin,  N.  and T.  Lemieux.  2000.  “Rank  regressions,  wage  distributions,  and  the  gender 
gap.” The Journal of Human Resources XXXIII: 610-643. 
Ganguli, Ina and Katherine Terrell. 2005. “Wage Ceilings and Floors: The Gender Gap in 
Ukraine’s Transition.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 1776, Bonn: Institute for the Study of 
Labor. 
Garcia, Jaume, Pedro Hernandez and Angel Lopez-Nicolas. 2001. “How wide is the gap? An 
investigation  of  gender  wage  differences  using  quantile  regression”  Empirical 
Economics 26:149-167. 
Gardeazabal,  J  and  A.  Ugidos.  2005.  “Measuring  the Wage  Distribution  Gender  Gap  at 
Quantiles” Journal of Population Economics, forthcoming. 
Glinskaya, Elena and Thomas Mroz. 2000. “The Gender Gap in Wages in Russia from 1992 
to 1995.” Journal of Population Economics 13(2): 353-386.  
Goonesekere,  Savithri.  1998.  “Laws  regulating  the  participation  and  status  of  women  in 
production: critical areas for reform” in Women in the Economy: Trends and Policy 
Issues, Centre for Women’s Research. Colombo. 
Gosling, A. S. Machin and C. Meghir.2000. “The changing distribution of male wages in the 
U.K.” Review of Economic Studies. 67:635-666. 
Gunatilaka, Ramani. 2003. “Real Wage Trends and Labour Market Integration”, Sri Lanka 
Economic Journal, 4(2): 81-104. 
Gunatilaka, Ramani and Ramya Hewarathna. 2002. “Real wage trends of female agricultural 
workers  and  the  gender  wage  gap  in  Sri  Lanka.”,  Sri  Lanka  Economic  Journal, 
3(2):1-31. 
Guneratne, Camena, International Labour Standards and Women in Sri Lanka, Study series 
No.24, Centre for Women’s Research, 2002. 
Gunewardena, Dileni. 2002. “Reducing the Gender Wage Gap in Sri Lanka: Is Education 
Enough?” Sri Lanka Economic Journal 3(2): 57-103 
Gunewardena,  Dileni,  Shobana  Rajendran,  Darshi  Abeyrathna,  Kamani  Rajakaruna  and 
Amalie Ellagala. 2006. “The Gender Wage Gap in Sri Lanka”. Paper presented at 
Seminar on Gender and Economic Reforms, Jaipur, India. February.  
Gunewardena,  Dileni,  Shobana  Rajendran,  Darshi  Abeyrathna,  Kamani  Rajakaruna  and 
Amalie  Ellagala.  2007.  “Glass  ceilings,  sticky  floors  or  sticky  doors?  A  quantile 
regression  approach  to  exploring  gender  wage  gaps  in  Sri  Lanka”  Final  Report, 
PMMA project pr-pmma-416. Pep Network, www.pep-net.org. 
Heckman, J. 1979. “Sample selection bias as a specification error” Econometrica 47:153-
161. 
Horton,  Susan.  1996.  Women  and  Industrialisation  in  Asia.  London  and  New  York: 
Routledge. Cited in World Bank 2001.  
  34 
Hyder, Asma and Barry Reilly. 2006. “The Public Sector Pay Gap in Pakistan: A Quantile 
Regression Analysis”. Pakistan Development Review, (forthcoming). 
International  Labour  Organisation  and  the  Employers  Federation  of  Ceylon.  2005. 
“Guidelines for Company Policy on Gender Equity/Equality”. Colombo.  
Jayaweera, Swarna and Sanmugam, Thana 1998. Women’s Rights in the Informal Sector – 
Mahaweli Settlements - Coir Industry. Colombo: Centre for Women’s Research. 
Jayaweera,  Swarna,  Thana  Sanmugam  and  Chandra  Rodrigo,  2000.  Invisible  Women: 
Workers in Subcontracted Industries in Sri Lanka, Study Series No.15, Centre for 
Women’s Research. 
Kee, Hiau Joo. 2006. “Glass Ceiling or Sticky Floor? Exploring the Australian Gender Pay 
Gap  using  Quantile  Regression  and  Counterfactual  Decomposition  Methods” 
Economic Record. 
Kiribanda, B.M. 1997. Population and Employment In Dilemmas of Development edited by 
W. D. Lakshman. Colombo: Sri Lanka Association of Economists, pp. 223-249. 
Kiribanda,  B.M.  1981.  Education,  Female  Labour  Force  Status,  and  Fertility 
Interrelationships: A Study of Dynamics and Differentials in Sri Lanka, 1971. Ph.D. 
Diss. University of Pennsylvania. Cited in Kiribanda 1997. 
Koenker, R. and G. Bassett. 1978. “Regression Quantiles”. Econometrica 46:33-50. 
Koenker, R. and K. Hallock. 2001. “Quantile Regression.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
14 (4):  143-156. 
Lee, L.F. 1983. “Generalized Econometric Models with Selectivity”. Econometrica 51:507-
512. 
Machado,  J.  and  J.  Mata.  2005.  Counterfactual  Decompositions  of  Changes  in  Wage 
Distributions using Quantile Regression. Journal of Applied Econometrics. 20:445-
465. 
Manuratne,  M.P.  1999.  Sri  Lankave  Mahaweli  janavasayanhi  paula  tula  kanthavange 
wenaswana karyabharaya pilibandava samaja vidyatmaka adyanayak: Mahaweli C 
Kalapaya asrayen. (A Sociological study of the changing roles of women within the 
family  in  Sri  Lanka’s  Mahaweli  settlements:  in  relation  to  Mahaweli  Area  C). 
Unpublished Masters Thesis. Department of Sociology, University of Peradeniya, Sri 
Lanka. 
Melly, Blaise. 2005. “Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials in Germany: Evidence from 
Quantile Regressions”. Empirical Economics.30: 505-520. 
Meng, Xin and Paul Miller. 1995. “Occupational Segregation and Its Impact on Gender Wage 
Description in China’s Rural Industrial Sector”. Oxford Economic Papers 47:136-55. 
Mincer, Jacob. 1974. Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: Colombia University 
Press. 
Montenegro, Claudia. 2001. Wage Distribution in Chile: Does Gender Matter? A Quantile 
Regression Approach. Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working 
Paper Series No. 20.  
Mueller, R. 1998. “Public-private sector wage differentials in Canada: evidence from quantile 
regressions.” Economics Letters 60:229-235. 
Neumark,  David.  1988.  Employers’  Discriminatory  Behavior  and  the  Estimation  of Wage 
Discrimination. The Journal of Human Resources 23 (3): 279-295. 
Newell, A. and B. Reilly. 2001. “The Gender Pay Gap in the Transition from Communism: 
Some Empirical Evidence. Economic Systems 25(4): 287-304.   
  35 
Ňopo, Hugo. 2004. “Matching as a Tool to Decompose Wage Gaps”, IZA Discussion Paper 
no. 981, January. 
Oaxaca,  Ronald.  1973.  "Male-female  wage  differentials  in  urban  labor  markets." 
International Economic Review 14 (October): 693-709. 
Pendakur,  Krishna  and  Ravi  Pendakur.  2007.  “Minority  Earnings  Disparity  Across  the 
Distribution” forthcoming. Canadian Public Policy. 
Pham, T. Hung and Barry Reilly. 2006. “The Gender Pay Gap in Vietnam, 1993-2002: A 
Quantile Regression Approach”, PRUS Working Paper no. 34, July 2006. 
Psacharopoulos, George and Tzannatos, Zafiris. 1992. Women’s Employment and Pay in 
Latin America: Overview and Methodology. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Rama,  Martin.  2003.  “The  Sri  Lankan  Unemployment  Problem  Revisited”,  Review  of 
Development Economics, 7(3) : 510-525. 
Reimers, Cordelia W. 1983. Labor Market Discrimination Against Hispanic and Black Men. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics [65(4): 570-579.] 
Sakellariou,  Chris.  2004.  “The  use  of  quantile  regressions  in  estimating  gender  wage 
differentials: a case study of the Philippines”. Applied Economics 36, 1001-1007. 
Sri  Lanka  Bureau  of  Foreign  Employment.  2002.  Statistical  Handbook  2002.  SLBFE. 
Colombo. 
Tansel, Aysit. 2005. “Public-Private Employment Choice, Wage Differentials, and Gender in 
Turkey” Economic Development and Cultural Change, volume 53:453–477. 
Tannuri-Pianto,  Maria,  Donald  Pianto  and  Omar  Arias.  2004.  “Informal  Employment  in 
Bolivia: A Lost Proposition?” in Econometric Society Series, Econometric Society, 
Latin American Meetings, No. 149.  
United Nations Development Programme. 2000. Human Development Report 2000. New 
York: United Nations Development Programme. 
Wickramasinghe, Maithree and Wijaya Jayatilaka. 2006. Beyond Glass Ceilings and Brick 
Walls:  Gender  at  the  Workplace.  International  Labour  Organisation  and  the 
Employers Federation of Ceylon. Colombo. 
Wickramasinghe, Maithree and Wijaya Jayatilaka. 2005. Gender Barriers at the Workplace 
and women in management. International Labour Organisation Research Study. 
World Bank. 2001. Engendering Development through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources 
and Voice. World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, D.C.: Oxford University 
Press. 
World  Bank.  2007.  Sri  Lanka  Poverty  Assessment:  Engendering  Growth  with  Equity: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Report No. 36568.  
  36 
Table 1:  Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap in Sri Lanka, 1985-2000 
(% of wage gap)  Study  Data Source and Year  Sample size  Size of 
Gender 
Wage Gap 
Baseline  Dependent 
variable, 
Specification  Unexplained  Explained 
Hourly  Wages, 
OLS 
104  -4  32%  Female 
Hourly  Wages, 
Fixed Effects 
136  -36 
Earnings, OLS  102  -2 
Labour  Force  and 
Socioeconomic  survey 
1985/86 




Fixed Effects Sample, 
Males=1450, 
Females=548 
35%  Female 
Earnings,  Fixed 
Effects 
130  -30 
Earnings, OLS  117  -17 
Gunewardena  
2002 
Household  Income  and 
Expenditure Survey 1991 




Fixed Effects Sample, 
Males=1431, 
Females=578 
25%  Female 
Earnings,  Fixed 
Effects 
130  -30 
Male  Earnings  61  39  Aturupane 1997  Pooled  data  from  Quarterly 
Labour  Force  Surveys  of 
1994 
Males = 4882 
Females=2169 
14% 
Female  Earnings  51  49 
Male  98  2  Males = 1184 
Females = 763 
16% 
Female 
Hourly  Wages, 
Sinhalese  102  -2 
Male  380  -280  Males = 68 
Females = 33 
5% 
Female 
Hourly  Wages, 
Tamil  -240  340 
Male  279  -179  Males = 63 
Females = 21 
16% 
Female 
Hourly  Wages 
Moor  -430  530 
Male  48  52 
Ajwad  and 
Kurukulasuriya 
2002 






Hourly  Wages, 
Other  -20  120 
    Males = 1184 
Females = 763 
15%  n.a.  Overall  n.a.  n.a. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics, Public and Private Sectors, 1996/97 
  Public  Private 
Variable  Male  Female  Male  Female 
  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
Hourly earnings (Rs.)  25.024  15.620  29.221  20.270  17.242  12.793  13.880  10.089 
Log of hourly earnings  3.069  0.543  3.215  0.578  2.678  0.585  2.466  0.560 
 
No schooling  0.007  0.085  0.005  0.073  0.021  0.144  0.039  0.194 
Sub-primary  0.043  0.202  0.014  0.119  0.185  0.389  0.109  0.312 
Completed Primary  0.108  0.311  0.021  0.144  0.230  0.421  0.142  0.349 
Completed lower secondary  0.224  0.417  0.065  0.247  0.309  0.462  0.335  0.472 
Completed GCE O/L  0.344  0.475  0.335  0.472  0.181  0.385  0.243  0.429 
Completed GCE A/L  0.193  0.394  0.396  0.489  0.063  0.243  0.118  0.323 
Post-secondary  0.081  0.274  0.163  0.370  0.011  0.104  0.012  0.111 
 
Formal training  0.255  0.436  0.335  0.472  0.131  0.338  0.131  0.337 
Informal training  0.033  0.178  0.010  0.099  0.100  0.300  0.043  0.203 
No training  0.712  0.453  0.655  0.475  0.769  0.422  0.826  0.379 
 
Age  38.138  9.602  37.014  8.995  34.203  10.261  29.706  9.299 
Occupational experience  11.333  8.401  10.973  8.166  7.938  7.361  4.637  4.936 
Part time status  0.083  0.276  0.298  0.457  0.043  0.204  0.050  0.219 
Married  0.765  0.424  0.699  0.459  0.649  0.477  0.346  0.476 
 
Sinhala  0.936  0.245  0.927  0.260  0.804  0.397  0.874  0.332 
Tamil  0.035  0.184  0.040  0.197  0.104  0.305  0.095  0.293 
Moor  0.025  0.155  0.032  0.176  0.086  0.280  0.020  0.139 
Other  0.005  0.069  0.001  0.028  0.007  0.085  0.011  0.106 
 
Western  0.356  0.479  0.337  0.473  0.454  0.498  0.498  0.500 
Central  0.147  0.354  0.160  0.367  0.161  0.367  0.139  0.346 
Southern  0.155  0.362  0.155  0.362  0.111  0.314  0.095  0.293 
North Western  0.100  0.301  0.109  0.312  0.105  0.307  0.105  0.306 
North Central  0.099  0.299  0.078  0.269  0.043  0.202  0.043  0.203 
Uva  0.062  0.241  0.062  0.240  0.037  0.188  0.031  0.174 
Sabaragamuwa  0.081  0.273  0.099  0.298  0.090  0.286  0.089  0.285 
 
Mining and Construction  0.038  0.192  0.013  0.113  0.257  0.437  0.026  0.159 
Manufacturing  0.033  0.179  0.021  0.144  0.259  0.438  0.677  0.468 
Electricity, Gas & Water, Trade , 
Hospitality, Transport, 
Communication & Finance  0.269  0.444  0.116  0.321  0.349  0.477  0.126  0.332 
Services  0.659  0.474  0.850  0.358  0.136  0.343  0.172  0.377 
 
Senior Officials, Managers,  
Professionals  0.163  0.370  0.521  0.500  0.027  0.163  0.040  0.195 
Technicians and Associate  
professionals  0.152  0.359  0.140  0.347  0.042  0.200  0.036  0.187 
Clerks  0.151  0.358  0.244  0.429  0.061  0.240  0.114  0.318 
Sales and Service Workers  0.196  0.397  0.028  0.165  0.143  0.350  0.065  0.247 
Craft and Related Workers  0.073  0.260  0.019  0.137  0.320  0.466  0.456  0.498 
Plant and Machine Operators and   
Assemblers  0.089  0.285  0.002  0.039  0.155  0.362  0.087  0.281 
Elementary Occupations  0.176  0.381  0.047  0.212  0.252  0.434  0.202  0.402 
 
Sample size  2320    1317    4431    1766    
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics, Public and Private Sectors, 2003/2004 
  Public  Private 
Variable  Male  Female  Male  Female 
  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
Hourly earnings (Rs.)  27.750  17.524  30.934  14.914  18.366  15.483  14.501  11.603 
Log of hourly earnings  3.185  0.513  3.310  0.523  2.737  0.572  2.490  0.579 
 
No schooling  0.004  0.061  0.005  0.072  0.024  0.153  0.036  0.187 
Sub-primary  0.043  0.203  0.018  0.132  0.169  0.375  0.129  0.335 
Completed Primary  0.078  0.269  0.015  0.123  0.216  0.412  0.135  0.342 
Completed lower secondary  0.241  0.428  0.078  0.268  0.336  0.472  0.331  0.471 
Completed GCE O/L  0.273  0.446  0.220  0.414  0.159  0.366  0.170  0.376 
Completed GCE A/L  0.246  0.431  0.484  0.500  0.082  0.275  0.176  0.381 
Post-secondary  0.114  0.317  0.180  0.384  0.014  0.117  0.022  0.148 
 
Formal training  0.233  0.423  0.349  0.477  0.127  0.333  0.135  0.341 
Informal training  0.017  0.129  0.013  0.111  0.067  0.250  0.035  0.185 
No training  0.750  0.433  0.638  0.481  0.806  0.395  0.830  0.376 
 
Age  39.981  9.363  39.404  8.861  34.658  10.627  31.899  10.506 
Occupational experience  13.392  8.619  12.895  8.383  8.786  8.019  5.359  5.911 
Part time status  0.087  0.282  0.271  0.444  0.058  0.234  0.065  0.246 
Married  0.843  0.364  0.777  0.416  0.664  0.472  0.426  0.495 
 
Sinhala  0.936  0.245  0.928  0.259  0.825  0.380  0.882  0.323 
Tamil  0.037  0.189  0.035  0.183  0.100  0.300  0.090  0.286 
Moor  0.025  0.157  0.035  0.183  0.068  0.252  0.026  0.159 
Other  0.001  0.038  0.003  0.054  0.008  0.087  0.003  0.055 
 
Western  0.279  0.449  0.253  0.435  0.352  0.478  0.381  0.486 
Central  0.131  0.338  0.137  0.344  0.131  0.338  0.138  0.345 
Southern  0.158  0.365  0.184  0.387  0.145  0.352  0.138  0.345 
North Western  0.136  0.343  0.138  0.345  0.136  0.342  0.129  0.335 
North Central  0.120  0.325  0.098  0.297  0.054  0.225  0.054  0.225 
Uva  0.085  0.279  0.088  0.284  0.053  0.224  0.040  0.196 
Sabaragamuwa  0.091  0.287  0.102  0.303  0.129  0.335  0.122  0.327 
 
Mining and Construction  0.014  0.118  0.000  0.000  0.215  0.411  0.020  0.141 
Manufacturing  0.022  0.147  0.021  0.142  0.251  0.434  0.614  0.487 
Electricity, Gas & Water, Trade, 
Hospitality, Transport, 
Communication & Finance  0.144  0.351  0.086  0.281  0.333  0.471  0.142  0.349 
Services  0.820  0.385  0.893  0.309  0.201  0.401  0.223  0.416 
 
Senior Officials, Managers,  
Professionals  0.170  0.375  0.456  0.498  0.024  0.154  0.046  0.209 
Technicians and Associate  
professionals  0.192  0.394  0.204  0.403  0.056  0.229  0.066  0.249 
Clerks  0.131  0.338  0.213  0.409  0.053  0.225  0.106  0.308 
Sales and Service Workers  0.189  0.392  0.040  0.195  0.089  0.284  0.081  0.274 
Craft and Related Workers  0.062  0.242  0.015  0.123  0.279  0.448  0.389  0.488 
Plant and Machine Operators and   
Assemblers  0.068  0.251  0.005  0.072  0.136  0.343  0.057  0.232 
Elementary Occupations  0.188  0.391  0.067  0.250  0.363  0.481  0.255  0.436 
 
Sample size  2129    1360    5129    1976    
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Table 4:  Raw and estimated wage gaps, 1996/97 
Mean Percentile 
Raw gap  10
th  25
 th  50
 th  75
 th  90
 th 
Pooled  0.026 0.152  0.102  0.122  -0.128  -0.145 
  (0.014) (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.019) 
Public  -0.146 0  -0.127  -0.237  -0.223  -0.104 
  (0.019) (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.033) 
Private  0.212 0.288  0.188  0.201  0.251  0.236 
  (0.016) (0.034)  (0.025)  (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.030) 
Estimated wage gap model 1           
Male Characteristics           
Pooled  0.105 0.219  0.151  0.088  0.032  0.021 
  (0.012) (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Public  0.027 0.175  0.087  -0.034  -0.059  -0.03 
  (0.019) (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Private  0.201 0.328  0.24  0.198  0.176  0.121 
  (0.018) (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Female Characteristics           
Pooled  0.110 0.162  0.142  0.117  0.071  0.055 
  (0.011) (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.022) 
Public  -0.001 0.081  -0.002  -0.042  -0.026  0.001 
  (0.016) (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
Private  0.182 0.178  0.152  0.183  0.223  0.238 
  (0.015) (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
Estimated wage gap model 2  OLS 10%  25%  50%  75%  90% 
 
Male Characteristics 
         
Pooled  0.188 0.261  0.224  0.186  0.149  0.116 
  (0.018) (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.022) 
Public  0.142 0.259  0.2  0.093  0.042  0.045 
  (0.033) (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.017) 
Private  0.224 0.292  0.247  0.235  0.24  0.217 
  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Female Characteristics           
Pooled  0.178 0.185  0.174  0.185  0.136  0.138 
  (0.012) (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
Public  0.089 0.147  0.088  0.057  0.074  0.086 
  (0.017) (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
Private  0.211 0.180  0.173  0.199  0.250  0.255 
  (0.016) (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.023) 
           
Note:  Estimated  wage  gaps  are  the  coefficients  component  of  the  wage  gap  decomposition, 
evaluated at male [Xm ( βm - βf)] and female [Xf ( βm - βf)]characteristics. For OLS, this is the standard 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, evaluated at mean characteristics. For the quantiles, the results are 
obtained using the Machado-Mata decomposition (2005). Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Except for the coefficients in italics, all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level of significance. Estimated gaps are given for two model specifications. Both models included 
age, occupational experience, dummy variables for education, whether any (formal/informal) training 
received, ethnicity, marital status, region (7 provinces). Model 2 also included dummy variables for 
part-time status, 7 occupational categories and 4 industrial categories.  
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Table 5:  Raw and estimated wage gaps, 2003/04 
Mean Percentile 






Pooled  0.044 0.221  0.167  0.074  -0.124  -0.149 
  (0.013) (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.024) 
Public  -0.125 -0.091  -0.172  -0.207  -0.188  -0.079 
  (0.018) (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.030) 
Private  0.244 0.293  0.267  0.249  0.22  0.22 
  (0.015) (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
Estimated wage gap model 1           
Male Characteristics           
Pooled  0.151 0.25  0.197  0.147  0.084  0.049 
  (0.012) (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Public  0.006 0.146  0.016  -0.056  -0.074  -0.042 
  (0.018) (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
Private  0.244 0.293  0.268  0.249  0.22  0.222 
  (0.016) (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
Female Characteristics           
Pooled  0.150 0.252  0.207  0.138  0.063  0.064 
  (0.011) (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
Public  0.008 0.042  -0.029  -0.047  -0.026  0.022 
  (0.016) (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
Private  0.248 0.257  0.251  0.252  0.242  0.249 
  (0.014) (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.021) 
Estimated wage gap model 2                  
Male Characteristics           
Pooled  0.205 0.312  0.258  0.207  0.143  0.085 
  (0.017) (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.023) 
Public  0.134 0.273  0.178  0.101  0.051  0.053 
  (0.021) (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Private  0.25 0.331  0.297  0.271  0.231  0.188 
  (0.023) (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Female Characteristics           
Pooled  0.202 0.278  0.241  0.187  0.106  0.120 
  (0.011) (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
Public  0.070 0.097  0.032  0.026  0.035  0.087 
  (0.016) (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Private  0.266 0.278  0.264  0.260  0.255  0.235 
  (0.015) (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.021) 
Note:  Estimated  wage  gaps  are  the  coefficients  component  of  the  wage  gap  decomposition, 
evaluated at male [Xm ( βm - βf)] and female [Xf ( βm - βf)]characteristics. For OLS, this is the standard 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, evaluated at mean characteristics. For the quantiles, the results are 
obtained using the Machado-Mata decomposition (2005). Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Except for the coefficients in italics, all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level of significance. Estimated gaps are given for two model specifications. Both models included 
age, occupational experience, dummy variables for education, whether any (formal/informal) training 
received, ethnicity, marital status, region (7 provinces). Model 2 also included dummy variables for 
part-time status, 7 occupational categories and 4 industrial categories.  
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Table 6:  Gender gap as % of male gap and percentage raw gap unexplained, 1996/97 
& 2003/04 
  Gaps as a percentage of male wages  Unexplained as a % of raw 





Pooled  2.6  14.1  9.7  11.5  -13.7  -15.6  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Public  -15.7  0.0  -13.5  -26.7  -25.0  -11.0  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Private  19.1  25.0  17.1  18.2  22.2  21.0  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Estimated wage gap model 1 
Male characteristics 
Pooled  10.0  19.7  14.0  8.4  3.1  2.1  403.8  144.1  148.0  72.1  -25.0  -14.5 
Public  2.7  16.1  8.3  -3.5  -6.1  -3.0  -18.5  -  -68.5  14.3  26.5  28.8 
Private  18.2  28.0  21.3  18.0  16.1  11.4  94.8  113.9  127.7  98.5  70.1  51.3 
Female characteristics 
Pooled  10.4  15.0  13.2  11.0  6.9  5.4  423.1  106.6  139.2  95.9  -55.5  -37.9 
Public  -0.1  7.8  -0.2  -4.3  -2.6  0.1  0.7  -  1.6  17.7  11.7  -1.0 
Private  16.6  16.3  14.1  16.7  20.0  21.2  85.8  61.8  80.9  91.0  88.8  100.8 
Estimated wage gap model 2 
Male characteristics 
Pooled  17.1  23.0  20.1  17.0  13.8  11.0  723.1  171.7  219.6 152.5 -116.4  -80.0 
Public  13.2  22.8  18.1  8.9  4.1  4.4  -97.3  -  -157.5  -39.2  -18.8  -43.3 
Private  20.1  25.3  21.9  20.9  21.3  19.5  105.7  101.4  131.4 116.9  95.6  91.9 
Female characteristics 
Pooled  16.3  16.9  16.0  16.9  12.7  12.9  684.6  121.7  170.6 151.6 -106.3  -95.2 
Public  8.5  13.7  8.4  5.5  7.1  8.2  -61.0  -  -69.3  -24.1  -33.2  -82.7 





Pooled  4.3  19.8  15.4  7.1  -13.2  -16.1  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Public  -13.3  -9.5  -18.8  -23.0  -20.7  -8.2  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Private  21.9  26.7  22.7  23.0  22.1  20.1  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Estimated wage gap model 1 
Male characteristics 
Pooled  14.0  22.0  17.9  13.7  8.1  4.7  343.2  112.7  118.0 198.6  -68.5  -32.2 
Public  0.6  13.6  1.6  -5.8  -7.7  -4.3  -4.8 -160.4  -9.3  27.1  39.4  53.2 
Private  21.7  25.4  23.5  22.0  19.7  19.9  98.8  94.2  103.9  95.0  88.0  98.7 
Female characteristics 
Pooled  13.9  22.4  18.6  12.9  5.9  6.0  340.9  114.5  123.4 186.5  -49.2  -41.6 
Public  0.8  4.1  -2.9  -4.8  -2.6  2.2  -6.4  -46.2  16.9  22.7  13.8  -27.8 
Private  22.0  22.7  22.2  22.3  21.5  22.0  100.4  82.6  97.3  96.2  96.8  110.7 
Estimated wage gap model 2 
Male characteristics 
Pooled  18.0  26.8  22.7  18.9  13.4  8.1  452.3  141.2  154.5 282.4 -116.1  -57.0 
Public  7.4  23.9  16.3  9.6  5.0  5.2  -61.6 -300.0 -103.5  -48.8  -27.1  -67.1 
Private  22.7  28.2  25.7  23.7  20.6  17.0  104.0  106.4  115.1 103.4  92.4  82.7 
Female characteristics 
Pooled  18.3  24.3  21.4  17.1  10.1  11.3  459.1  125.8  144.3 252.7  -85.5  -80.5 
Public  6.8  9.2  3.1  2.6  3.4  8.3  -56.0 -106.6  -18.6  -12.6  -18.6 -110.1 
Private  23.4  24.3  23.2  22.9  22.5  20.9  107.7  89.4  102.3  99.2  102.0  104.4 
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Table 7:  Summary of results, Sticky Floors and Glass Ceilings 
  Part Time, Occupation and Industry excluded  Part Time, Occupation and Industry included 
  Glass ceiling 
measured by
1 






Sticky floor measured 
by
2 






































  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14] 
Pooled 
2003/04 
Male      ￿  ￿  ￿  Decreasing  5-25      ￿  ￿  ￿  Decreasing  9-31 
Female      ￿  ￿  ￿    6-25      ￿  ￿  ￿    12-28 
1996/97 
Male      ￿  ￿  ￿  Decreasing  2-22          ￿    12-26 
Female          ￿    6-16              4-26 
Public 
2003/04 
Male      ￿  ￿  ￿    -7-15      ￿  ￿  ￿    5-27 
Female      ￿  ￿  ￿    -5-4          ￿    3-10 
1996/97 
Male      ￿  ￿  ￿    -3-18      ￿  ￿  ￿    4-26 
Female  ￿  ￿    ￿  ￿    -3-3      ￿  ￿  ￿    6-15 
Private 
2003/04 
Male          ￿    22-29              19-33 
Female              25-26              24-28 
1996/97 
Male      ￿  ￿  ￿    12-33      ￿  ￿  ￿    22-29 
Female    ￿          15-24    ￿          17-26 
1 A ‘glass ceiling’ is defined to exist if the 90
th percentile wage gap is higher than the reference wage gap by at least 4 points. 
2 A ‘sticky floor’ is defined to exist if the 10
th percentile wage gap is higher than the reference wage gap by at least 4 points.  
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